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The moderating effect of group status on intragroup and intergroup processing and 
self-stereotyping is examined. Self-stereotyping is “the perceptual interchangeability 
or perceptual identity of oneself and others in the same group on relevant 
dimensions” (Turner, 1984).  The current argument is that membership in groups 
marked by low status is conducive to intergroup processing (comparison between 
groups) and therefore higher levels of self-stereotyping, while membership in groups 
marked by high status is conducive to intragroup processing (comparison within 
group), and in turn less self-stereotyping. Four studies examined “default” processing 
and self-stereotyping in the context of gender and sexual orientation (Study 1 and 2) 
and by directly manipulating the comparative context (Study 3 and 4). Overall the 
results provide only limited support for the key predictions. Methodological and 




 Stereotypes are sets of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of 
people (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981). Research on stereotypes and stereotyping in 
social psychology is abundant, ranging from mechanisms of stereotype formation and 
maintenance, to stereotype activation and application. Not only do we hold 
stereotypes about others, but simultaneously others hold stereotypes about us, based 
on our group memberships. Furthermore, we know and often endorse the stereotypes 
that are characteristic of our groups. In the first empirical investigation of the content 
of stereotypes, Katz and Braly (1933) found that students expressed equal consensus 
about the characteristics that typified the ingroup “American” and other national and 
ethnic groups.  
 One question that has received research attention in recent decades concerns 
the conditions under which individuals endorse and incorporate stereotypes of their 
group(s) into the self-concept. Are there situations in which a person will be more 
likely to emphasize her similarity to other members of her ingroup, versus her 
distinctiveness as a unique individual? Research on the phenomenon of self-
stereotyping suggests that a variety of conditions (e.g. category salience, group threat) 
produce these tendencies. The focus in this research is on the role of group status in 
affecting how the self is defined in relation to the ingroup, and more particularly on 
the moderating effect of group status on self-stereotyping. 
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Group status is defined as the relative rank of groups in the social hierarchy. 
The term “status” has been used in the literature very broadly, from beliefs about the 
relative performance of groups on some experimental tasks, to stigmatized group 
memberships (Ellemers & Barreto, 2001). In the current manuscript, status is 
operationalized as the relative prestige or social standing of groups in the social 
hierarchy, which can be based on “power differences, differential access to material 
resources, or on the nature of interdependence and goal relations between groups” 
(Ellemers & Barreto, 2001, p. 325). Although status can be context-specific, with 
different comparative contexts influencing the perceived status position of a target 
group (Ellemers & Van Knippenberg, 1997), I am considering the general case of 
status differences between groups.  
First, I will discuss the concept of self-stereotyping and how it has been 
operationalized in the research literature. Following a review of self-categorization 
theory in regard to self-stereotyping, I will discuss the role of group status on self-
stereotyping effects. Both cognitive (e.g. salience) and motivational (e.g. group 
identification) accounts of the conditions under which group status influences self-
stereotyping, will be addressed.  
 Second, I will discuss research findings relevant to the importance of 
intergroup and intragroup context. Drawing upon different lines of research (e.g. 
Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1995, 2006; Smith & Zarate, 1992) I will 
develop the argument that social status affects whether individuals engage in 
intragroup processing (comparison to others within the group) versus intergroup 
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processing (comparison to outgroup members), which in turn has implications for 
patterns of self-stereotyping in different groups. Four empirical studies examining 
intragroup and intergroup processing and self-stereotyping effects within the 
framework of gender and sexual orientation will be reported. Studies1 and 2 
investigate the intragroup and intergroup processing and self-stereotyping in “default” 
condition (i.e. no comparative context is introduced), while Studies 3 and 4 further 
investigate those two types of processing and consequent self-stereotyping effects by 
directly manipulating the comparative context.  
Self-stereotyping 
The concept of self-stereotyping derives from social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), and was explicitly defined as part of self-categorization theory 
(Turner, 1982, 1984; Turner et al., 1987). According to this perspective, self-
stereotyping is “the perceptual interchangeability or perceptual identity of oneself and 
others in the same group on relevant dimensions” (Turner, 1984, p. 528). The self-
stereotyping hypothesis sets forth identity salience as an important situational feature 
that leads to both self- and other-stereotyping: “Once some specific social 
identification is salient, a person assigns to self and others the common, typical or 
representative characteristics that define their group as a whole” (Brown & Turner, 
1981, p. 39). Turner and his colleagues suggest that self-stereotyping is a 
consequence of self-categorization, where “self-categorization leads to a stereotypical 
self-perception and depersonalization, and adherence to and expression of ingroup 
normative behavior” (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987, p. 102).  
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Definitions and measurement  
 Self-stereotyping has been defined and measured in many ways, with 
measurement not always following strict theoretical definitions. Self-stereotyping has 
been defined in terms of a perception of self as an exemplary group member (Burris 
& Jackson, 2000; Turner, et al., 1987), and as a prototypical group member (Burkley 
& Blanton, 2005; Hardie & McMurray, 1992; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; 
Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999). Simon, Glässner-Bayerl, and Stratenwerth (1991) define 
self-stereotyping as “a shared representation of one’s group as a whole (i.e. ingroup 
stereotyping) as well as representations of one’s unique person (i.e. ego-
stereotyping).” For example, with regard to gender, ingroup stereotyping would occur 
if women view women in general as “nurturing.” The ego-stereotyping aspect would 
involve a woman viewing herself as nurturing as well. Similar to the concept of ego-
stereotyping is the definition of self-stereotyping as applying cultural stereotypes to 
the self (Biernat, Vescio, & Green, 1996; Brewer & Pickett, 1999; Sinclair, Hardin & 
Lowery, 2006; Sinclair & Huntsinger, 2005). Other definitions include movement 
toward ingroup norms (Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002), such as defining oneself 
in terms of characteristics prescribed by the present ingroup norm, and a tendency for 
individuals to subscribe to beliefs that denigrate their social group and potentially 
harm themselves (Levy, 1996). 
Following these definitions, self-stereotyping has generally been measured 
mainly in two ways—either in terms of group-specific traits and attributes (e.g. 
Biernat, Vescio, & Green, 1996; Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002; Simon et al., 
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1991; Simon & Hamilton, 1994) or in terms of general perceptions of similarity to the 
group prototype (e.g. Burkley & Blanton, 2005; Spears et al, 1997; Verkuyten & 
Nekuee, 1999). In regard to group-specific traits and attributes, the majority of the 
measures used are explicit, asking participants to rate themselves on particular 
attributes applicable to the group. For example, Biernat, Vescio, and Green (1996) 
assessed self-stereotyping in sorority members by asking them to provide self-ratings 
on 28 traits (e.g. active, cliquish) on a scale from not at all true of me (1) to very true 
of me (7), and Pickett, Bonner, and Coleman (2002) asked Ohio State University 
students to provide self-ratings on 75-word trait list on a scale ranging from not at all 
descriptive of me (1) to very descriptive of me (7). In addition to self-rating on 
ingroup attributes, some researchers have looked at rejection of corresponding 
outgroup attributes (Simon, et al., 1991; Simon & Hamilton, 1994) as well as self-
endorsement of stereotype-irrelevant attributes (Pickett et al., 2002).  
There are several studies that use implicit (or non-obvious) measures of self-
stereotyping in terms of group-specific traits (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; Brewer & 
Pickett, 1999; Onorato & Turner, 2004)1. For example, Lorenzi-Cioldi (1991) used a 
reaction-time measure to assess self-stereotyping for men and women, in which 
participants pressed a key labeled “me” or “not me” in response to computer-
presented traits. A faster response in hitting the “me” key for ingroup-specific traits 
and “not me” for outgroup-specific traits was taken to indicate self-stereotyping. 
Brewer and Pickett (1999) used the same paradigm (“me”/ “not me”) but in the 
context of the “Ohio State University students” ingroup. Onorato and Turner (2004) 
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measured reaction times as well but argued that the “me”/ “not me” paradigm 
captures only personal identity and “us”/ “them” captures social identity. Thus, it was 
participants’ reaction times on traits characterized as “us” / “them” that were 
indicative of self-stereotyping.  
Other types of measures used by various researchers to assess self-
stereotyping include collective self-esteem (Burris & Jackson, 2000), the match 
between women’s own sex role ideology (traditional, moderate, or feminist) and their 
perceptions of most women’s sex role ideology (Hardie & McMurray, 1992), as well 
as estimation of ingroup homogeneity (perceiving one’s ingroup members as highly 
similar to each other) with regard to stereotypic attributes (Simon et. al., 1991; Simon 
& Hamilton, 1994). The latter seems to capture some sense of the 
“interchangeability” component of Turner’s (1984) definition. 
 Some behavioral measures of self-stereotyping have been used as well. For 
example, Levy (1996) subliminally primed older adults with positive or negative 
words related to stereotypes associated with old age (e.g. wise versus senile). The 
behavioral measure used to assess activated self-stereotypes was a memory test 
tapping abilities that have been shown to decline in old age, such as immediate, 
learned, delayed, and auditory recall. In another study, Levy (2000) measured 
handwriting quality in older adults. Self-stereotyping was said to occur in these 
studies to the extent that individuals engaged in behavior (memory performance, 
handwriting quality) consistent with the primed group stereotype. Similarly, in an 
online communication study, Postmes and Spears (2002) content-analyzed 
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communications for their degree of “autonomy” in order to assess behavioral 
assimilation of men versus women to the male dominance stereotype.  
 To summarize, definitions of self-stereotyping vary considerably. Some have 
emphasized similarity of self to other ingroup members in terms of perceived 
prototypicality (e.g. Burkley & Blanton, 2005); others have emphasized similarity in 
terms of ascribing stereotypic ingroup attributes to the self (e.g. Biernat et al., 1996). 
Measures have varied even more, from trait ratings (e.g. Pickett et al., 2002) to 
perceived ingroup homogeneity (Simon & Hamilton, 1994) to behavior assimilation 
to ingroup stereotypes (Levy, 1996). 
 With such a variety of measures, one might wonder whether they all capture 
the same underlying construct of self-stereotyping. Simon and Hamilton (1994) used 
three measures of self-stereotyping (self-ratings, perceived similarity with ingroup 
members and ingroup homogeneity) and found that while similarity and homogeneity 
were strongly correlated, neither of them correlated with self-ratings. The authors 
speculate that self-ratings may reflect self-stereotyping effects on “the cognitive 
representation of oneself as an individual (“me” or the individual self),” while 
perceived similarity and homogeneity may reflect self-stereotyping effects on “the 
cognitive representation of oneself as a group (“we” or the shared self)” (p. 710). This 
distinction can also be applied to the implicit trait ratings. Using the “me” / “not me” 
paradigm to assess self-stereotyping maps onto the representation of the self as an 
individual part of a group, while using the “us” / “them” paradigm maps onto the 
representation of the shared self.  
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Burkley and Blanton (2005) also argue that although both perceived 
prototypicality and viewing stereotypic ingroup traits and attributes as being 
descriptive of the self have been used to measure “self-stereotyping,” they represent 
two forms of self-stereotyping that are not influenced by the same psychological 
processes. Although the authors do not explicitly identify those psychological 
processes, it appears that prototypicality may be influenced by depersonalization 
(Turner et al., 1987), whereas self-ratings may be influenced by general stereotype 
endorsement (i.e. acceptance of cultural stereotypes). Throughout this paper I will 
discuss self-stereotyping as though it is a unitary concept, but will highlight the 
different measurement methods used in each reviewed study.  
Self-categorization theory, group status and self-stereotyping  
 In the next section I will describe self-categorization theory (Turner, et al., 
1987) and its postulates as they apply to self-stereotyping because of the implications 
it has for intragroup and intergroup processing. Then I will describe the research on 
group status and self-stereotyping. These accounts have in common the idea that 




 Originally developed as a more comprehensive theoretical framework for the 
analysis of identity, self-categorization theory (Turner, 1982, 1984; Turner et. al., 
1987) has become increasingly influential in examining the processes of social 
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categorization and social perception, applicable to diverse areas such as group 
conformity, stereotyping, and group cohesion.  
 The basic assumption of self-categorization theory is that the self can be 
categorized at different levels of inclusiveness (Turner et. al, 1987). The two levels of 
identity particularly important for self-stereotyping processing are personal and 
social levels of identity. Personal identity refers to self-definitions that describe one 
in terms of a unique individual. It refers to “me” vs. “not me” categorizations, based 
on intragroup or interpersonal differentiations. Social identity refers to self-
definitions that describe one in terms of group membership. It refers to “us” vs. 
“them” categorizations, based on intergroup (ingroup-outgroup) differentiations. 
Self-categorization theory predicts that the salience of a particular social identity will 
inhibit the salience of personal identity and the salience of personal identity will 
inhibit categorization at the social level. It is the social level of categorization that is 
thought to lead to self-stereotyping and depersonalization, where the perceptions of 
self and others become assimilated along relevant category-specific dimensions 
(Turner, 1984).  
 In order for self-stereotyping to occur, a particular social category has to be 
salient: “People stereotype themselves and others in terms of salient social 
categorizations, and this stereotyping leads to an enhanced perceptual identity 
between self and ingroup members and an enhanced perceptual contrast between 
ingroup and outgroup members” (Turner & Onorato, 1999, p. 21). Salience is a joint 
function of one’s readiness to adopt a particular social category (or relative 
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accessibility) and the fit of that particular social category in the given social context. 
Readiness to adopt a particular social category can depend on one’s values, motives, 
goals, experiences, etc. For example, one important factor that influences one’s 
readiness to use a social category for self-definition is the extent to which one is 
identified with the group (e.g. Doosje & Ellemers, 1997). The more highly identified 
group members are, the more “ready” they will be to categorize on that particular 
group level. 
Fit is the match between the category and the social context, and it has two 
interrelated aspects—comparative and normative fit. Comparative fit is defined by the 
meta-contrast principle (Turner, 1985): A collection of stimuli is more likely to be 
categorized as an entity to the degree that the average differences perceived within the 
stimulus set are less than the average differences between them and the remaining 
stimuli that comprise the frame of reference. With regard to social groups, the meta-
contrast ratio will be high (and the salience of a particular social identity will 
increase) if differences between groups in the social context are perceived to be 
greater than the difference within the groups. For example, gender is more likely to be 
a salient category in a mixed-gender setting then a single-gender setting. Normative 
fit refers to the match between the content of the category and the given situation. In 
other words, it is high when category members match the normative expectations 
about the social groups. For example, gender will be salient in mixed-gender settings 
particularly when men and women behave consistently with expectations for men and 
 11 
women. Therefore, category salience will be experienced when differences between 
social groups are accentuated in normatively appropriate direction. 
 There are relatively few studies that have investigated self-stereotyping as an 
explicit function of perceiver readiness X fit. Hogg and Turner (1987) conducted a 
study that is often cited as support for the salience hypothesis and its relationship with 
self-stereotyping. In this study, men and women held discussions either in same-sex 
dyads (low group salience) or groups consisting of two men and two women (high 
group salience). In the same-sex dyads, members discussed topics on which they held 
differing opinions (as assessed in pre-testing); in the mixed-sex groups participants 
discussed topics “described as ones established by recent census to differentiate 
between the sexes—male students holding the opposite position to that held by the 
female students... in arguing for their own position, which were after all 
characteristics of their sex as a whole, the discussants would be acting as 
representatives of their own sex” (p.330). Gender salience was measured by asking 
participants to indicate the extent to which they felt they behaved as a typical member 
of their gender group. Results indicated that when group salience was high, both men 
and women judged themselves as more typically male and female respectively, in 
comparison with when the group salience was low. Self-stereotyping was assessed by 
trait measures relevant to gender stereotypes, calculated as a difference score between 
pre-testing and post-discussion ratings. Overall, higher stereotypical ratings were 
observed in the high salience condition. Both men and women rated themselves 
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higher on the stereotypical positive traits; men also rated themselves higher on 
stereotypical negative traits. 
 A more recent study (Postmes & Spears, 2002, Study 2), examined the 
readiness by fit interaction on self-stereotyping in the context of online 
communication. Perceivers’ readiness was manipulated by asking participants (both 
men and women) to unscramble sentences that were designed either to activate 
gender stereotypes (e.g. competitive) or neutral concepts. Fit was manipulated by 
asking participants to discuss a topic that was either stereotypically male or 
stereotypically female via computer. A third manipulation involved whether the 
participants were individuated (exchanged autobiographical information) or 
depersonalized (no autobiographical information exchanged). Self-stereotyping was 
assessed with the male subscale of the Dutch sex role inventory (a series of 
masculine-stereotypical traits, such as self-sufficient and competitive). Results 
indicated that self-stereotyping was affected by stereotype accessibility or readiness, 
such that men described themselves as more masculine than women when gender had 
been primed. This finding is consistent with other research demonstrating that 
priming social categories leads to more stereotypic self-descriptions (Chiu et al., 
1998; Levy, 1996). Additionally, stereotypic behavior was assessed by content-
analyzing the actual computer communications for autonomy (a male stereotypic 
trait). Men behaved more autonomously when they were primed with gender, 
discussed a masculine topic and were depersonalized. However, when a feminine 
topic was discussed, in the gender primed depersonalized condition, women behaved 
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more autonomously than men. What is interesting and difficult to explain from the 
salience aspect of self-categorization theory in Postmes and Spears’ (2002) research 
is that perceiver readiness and fit of the task can lead to both stereotypic (for men) 
and counter-stereotypic (for women) behaviors.  
 To summarize, the salience prediction of self-categorization theory in regard 
to self-stereotyping has received some, although limited and inconclusive support. 
Hogg and Turner (1987) found increased self-stereotyping in high gender salience 
condition. Postmes and Spears (2002) found that self-stereotyping was a result of 
perceiver readiness (gender primed). But the latter authors also found that stereotypic 
behavior emerged when discussing one topic (masculine for men) but counter-
stereotypic when discussing another topic (feminine for women). 
 As shown in Postmes and Spears (2002), and in lines of research by Levy 
(1996) and Chiu et al. (1998), readiness may be enhanced through a manipulation that 
makes a social category accessible in some way—i.e. through priming. Levy (1996, 
Study 2) primed not only old but young participants as well with positive and 
negative stereotypes of the elderly. Participants’ performance on a memory test was 
assessed. Results indicated that the primed stereotypes only affected the older adults: 
Those who were primed with negative stereotypes performed worse than those who 
were primed with positive stereotypes. For young participants there was no difference 
in performance based on priming. Levy’s (1996) research suggests that in order an 
activated stereotype to have an effect on behavior, it must be relevant to the 
individual.  
 14 
However, other researchers have found stereotype priming effects even among 
individuals who are not members of the stereotyped group (e.g. Bargh et al., 1996; 
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998; for a review, Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). 
For example, Bargh et al. (1996) found that college-aged participants who were 
primed with stereotypes of the elderly walked more slowly as they left the 
experiment, compared to those primed with neutral words. Although this research 
does not directly reflect on self-stereotyping, it shows that when stereotypes about a 
particular group are primed (whether one’s own or not), behavioral assimilation may 
result. An explanation for the discrepancy in priming effects of stereotypes 
(assimilation to primed ingroup stereotypes vs. assimilation to any primed 
stereotypes) is offered by the Active-Self account (Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 
2007). The Active-Self account argues that primes can alter the active self-concept, 
which in turn guides behavior. Thus, assimilation to primed ingroup stereotypes will 
occur if the stereotype is part of the active self-concept. Similarly, assimilation to any 
primed stereotypes will occur as long as the stereotypic features are perceived as 
being part of the chronic self-concept and situationally activated. 
 Group status and self-stereotyping 
In the research described thus far, members of both high and low status groups 
(e.g. men and women) have been included. But status has not been considered, 
explicitly, as a variable of interest. Several studies have addressed the connection 
between self-stereotyping and group status, either in the context of existing social 
relations between established groups (Simon et al., 1991) or within the framework of 
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the minimal group paradigm (in which groups are artificially created in the lab; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).  
 Simon et al. (1991) examined the effects of group status on self-stereotyping 
in the context of existing social groups—gay and straight men. Gay men are a 
stigmatized group (low status) relative to straight men. Self-stereotyping was 
measured by both perceptions of ingroup homogeneity (seeing one’s group members 
as highly similar to each other) as well as self-ratings on positive and negative 
stereotyped traits (e.g., “unstable” for gay men, “insensitive” for straight men). Gay 
men rated their group as more homogeneous than straight men (straight men showed 
only an outgroup homogeneity effect), and both straight and gay men self-endorsed 
positive attributes of their groups. But it was only gay men who also self-endorsed 
negative traits stereotypic of their ingroup. Consistent with self-categorization theory, 
this suggests that gay men (once their membership is made salient) see themselves as 
similar to other ingroup members (ingroup homogeneity), and they incorporate into 
their self-concepts all (both positive and negative) stereotypic attributes associated 
with their group. This study suggests that for low status groups, category salience 
may be more pronounced, leading to more self-stereotyping, in comparison with the 
corresponding high status group. 
 In another study by Simon and Hamilton (1994, Study 2), the minimal group 
paradigm was used to independently manipulate relative group size and status of the 
groups. Participants were randomly assigned to minority or majority groups based on 
their alleged preference for one of two painters. Those in the majority group were told 
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that they had the same preference as about 80% of the population, whereas 10% of 
the population had the opposite preference. For the minority group the numerical 
relation was reversed. Status was manipulated by indicating that the preferred painter 
was either very distinguished or not distinguished at all. Several measures were used 
to assess self-stereotyping: self-ratings on (alleged) ingroup and outgroup attributes, 
self-categorization (to what extent participants saw themselves as a group member) 
and ingroup homogeneity. For high and low status majority members there was no 
difference in self-stereotyping. But for minority members, those high in status showed 
more self-stereotyping than those low in status; high status minority members self-
stereotyped more than any other group. This study suggests that self-stereotyping is a 
combined function of the relative size and status of one’s ingroup, though the effect 
of status (at least in the minority condition) runs counter to the Simon et al.’s (1991) 
report of greater self-stereotyping among gay men. 
 A potential explanation for this finding is that both cognitive and 
motivational factors may have contributed to the greater tendency to self-stereotype 
among the high status minority. On the one hand, being in the numerical minority 
makes category membership salient. On the other hand, the need for a positive social 
identity may underlie the effect of status (Tajfel & Turner, 1986); being high status 
reinforces the positive social identity, thus leading to higher levels of self-
stereotyping. This points to the likelihood that self-stereotyping effects cannot be 
fully explained strictly by salience.  
 17 
Although SCT posits that self-stereotyping is a result of salient social identity, 
it also provides a motivational account of self-stereotyping as well. Turner et al. 
(1987) noted that depersonalization corresponds to a change in self-attitudes (from 
personal to social group attitudes), and thus it can be comparable to a dissonance-
reduction process (changing one’s attitude in order to justify some action). 
Individuals “identify with their group to make sense of and justify public behavior as 
a group member which has negative outcomes” (p. 53). Thus, the need to justify 
membership in a low status group might lead to perceiving oneself as a more 
prototypical group member.  
On the other hand, according to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986), people are motivated to perceive themselves favorably in relation to 
others; they are motivated to maintain relatively positive self-esteem (e.g. Sedikides, 
1993; Steele, 1988; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Since people derive their self-worth, in 
part, from the groups to which they belong, it follows that they will try to favorably 
compare their ingroup with other relevant outgroups. Thus the need for a positive 
social identity may underlie the effect of status (Tajfel & Turner, 1986); being high 
status reinforces the positive social identity, thus leading to higher levels of self-
stereotyping.  
Burkely and Blanton (2005) examined the two opposing motivational 
accounts by manipulating group status using a minimal group paradigm (Study 1), 
and using a naturally occurring group (Study 2). In Study 1 participants rated their 
preference for abstract paintings and were told that their painting preferences 
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indicated a strong “vertical orientation.” Status was manipulated by providing 
information that “vertically oriented” people constitute either a low-status or a high-
status group. On measures of perceived prototypicality, those in the high-status 
condition rated themselves higher in perceived prototypicality than those in the low-
status condition. This effect was moderated by the importance of the in-group: There 
was no difference in perceived prototypicality between those in the low-status and 
high-status condition at low levels of importance, but at high levels of importance, 
there was a significant difference in perceived prototypicality between those in the 
low-status and high-status. In other words, status increased the tendency to view 
oneself as a prototypical group member, but only when the importance of the group 
was high.  
In Study 2 the naturalistic group “university students” was used. Status was 
manipulated by asking participants to read an article indicating that the university 
they were attending (SUNY-Albany) was either nationally prestigious (high status) or 
had a failing reputation (low status). Similar to Study 1, high-status participants 
indicated more perceived prototypicality than low-status participants. This effect, 
however, was moderated by participants’ choice of attending the university (low-
choice: they did not have a large number of schools to choose from; high-choice: they 
did have a large number of schools to choose from). In the low-choice condition there 
was no difference between those in the low-status and high-status condition. In the 
high-choice condition, low-status participants described themselves in less prototypic 
terms than did the high-status participants. In other words, status increased the 
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tendency to view oneself as a prototypical group member, only when the participants 
indicated that they had high-choice in selecting their current university.  
The results from both Studies 1 and 2 supported the self-enhancement view of 
perceived prototypicality (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), with people seeing themselves as 
more prototypical in groups that reinforce positive social identity, and contradicted 
the self-justification view (Turner et al., 1987), with people seeing themselves as 
more prototypical to justify their membership to an undesired (low status) group.  
Thus, only one study discussed thus far demonstrated that low-status group 
members self-stereotype more (see themselves as more prototypical than high status 
group members (Simon et al, 1991). The others (Burkley & Blanton, 2005; Simon & 
Hamilton, 1994) show evidence for a self-enhancement account, where high status 
group members perceive themselves as more prototypical. One explanation lies in the 
groups used. Simon et al. (1991) used naturally occurring groups (i.e. gay and straight 
men) positioned differentially in the social hierarchy, whereas Burkley and Blanton 
(2005, Study 2) manipulated group status. Therefore, it appears that whether self-
stereotyping will occur among low-status or high-status group members may depend 
on the nature of the group status (manipulated vs. naturally occurring). The 
distinction between the two and its consequences for self-stereotyping are addressed 
in more detail later in the paper.  
Group status and identification 
A number of studies have looked at the effects of group status on self-
stereotyping by examining another motivational factor, group identification. Those 
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high versus low in levels of identification with a group should, almost by definition, 
see the group as highly relevant to their self-image, and therefore should be more 
likely to self-stereotype (Turner et al., 1987). Several studies have shown that 
identification leads to increased self-stereotyping, though particularly under 
conditions of threat to one’s group membership (Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Spears et 
al, 1997; Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999). For example, Spears et al. (1997) introduced 
psychology students, who were either high or low in “psychology student” 
identification, with status threat (Studies 1 and 2). Students were threatened by 
comparison to higher status physics students or affirmed by comparison to lower 
status art students.  Self-stereotyping was measured by perceived similarity with the 
group (being a typical group member). Across all studies, results indicated that high 
identifiers self-stereotyped more in comparison with low identifiers, particularly 
when under threat.  
In Spears et al. (1997) research, the implicit assumption is that ingroup 
identification and self-stereotyping are two distinct, although related processes. 
Ingroup identification is the importance of the group to one’s self-concept, while self-
stereotyping is the extent to which one perceives the self as similar to other ingroup 
members (e.g. Spears et al., 1997, Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999).  However, many 
definitions of identification have been proposed in the research literature. Some have 
measured it as a unitary concept (e.g. Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Hogg & 
Hains, 1996; Smith & Tyler, 1997), and others have argued that this unitary treatment 
is inadequate (e.g. Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Leach et al., 2008). 
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One of the common threads in definitions is that there is a subjective link between a 
person’s group membership and the person’s self-concept (Riketta, 2005). This 
subjective link is argued by some to be a combination of cognitive (i.e. self-
categorization), evaluative (i.e. group self-esteem or satisfaction with belonging to the 
group), and emotional (i.e. affective commitment or solidarity) components 
(Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Leach et al., 2008; Tajfel, 1978). Leach et 
al. (2008) further propose that the cognitive element of identification could be further 
divided into individual self-stereotyping and ingroup homogeneity. Although some 
authors have conflated self-stereotyping and ingroup identification (Leach et al, 2008; 
Riketta, 2008), the research literature on self-stereotyping has nonetheless treated the 
two concepts as capturing conceptually different aspects of group membership. 
Similarly, for the empirical studies presented later in the manuscript, identification is 
treated as a different aspect of group membership than self-stereotyping.  
Although there is empirical evidence showing that individuals assigned to 
high-status groups identify more strongly with their groups than people assigned to 
low-status groups (e.g. Ellemers, Doosje, van Knippernberg, & Wilke, 1992), the 
influence of status on identification can be more complicated when natural groups are 
considered. Members of high status groups may feel less need to identify with their 
group, than people who belong to the lower status group (e.g. Branscombe, Schmitt, 
& Harvey, 1999). Although the status difference benefits the high status group, their 
members may be less compelled to use the group as a basis for self-definition (Deaux, 
1996).  
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To summarize, research on group status and self-stereotyping has found that 
for naturally occurring groups, lower status group members (e.g. gay men) self-
stereotype more in comparison with higher status group members (e.g. straight men) 
under “default” conditions. When group status is manipulated (i.e. the intergroup 
context is salient), it appears that both cognitive and motivational factors play a role 
in self-stereotyping, leading those high in status (at least under certain conditions) to 
stereotype more (Burkely & Blanton, 2005; Simon & Hamilton, 1994, Study 2). 
Furthermore, one’s level of identification with a salient category can further moderate 
the effect of salience on self-stereotyping, with high identifiers being more likely to 
self-stereotype in comparison with low identifiers (e.g. Spears et al., 1997).   
Intergroup and intragroup contexts 
Thus far, I have discussed the concept of self-stereotyping and how it is 
operationalized in the research literature. I have also reviewed the conditions that 
promote self-stereotyping, and the impact of group status and identification on self-
stereotyping. In this section, I will describe relevant research on how the comparative 
context (intergroup versus intragroup) affects self-stereotyping. I will argue that 
group status contributes to whether intragroup or intergroup processing is engaged, 
and that this has implications for self-stereotyping. Discussion of several lines of 
research that contribute to this argument will follow.  
Comparative contexts and self-stereotyping 
As described previously, according to self-categorization theory, the self can 
be defined at different levels of inclusiveness: A personal level that defines the person 
 23 
as a unique individual and a social level that defines the person in terms of a group 
membership. One critical assumption of the theory is that in different contexts 
different levels of the self can become salient. In an intragroup context (i.e. a context 
only with ingroup members), the personal self may be particularly relevant and thus 
we tend to focus on differences between members of our ingroup, including 
ourselves. In other words, our personal identity—what makes us distinct from other 
ingroup members—is salient. In an intergroup context (i.e. a context in which there 
are one or more relevant outgroups), our social self is more likely to be salient and we 
will focus on intragroup similarities and intergroup differences. This difference in the 
salience of different identities depending on the context has implications for 
stereotyping, perceived ingroup variability and self-stereotyping (e.g. Guimond et al, 
2006; Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995; Verkuyten & De Wolfe, 2002). 
Specifically, the greater salience achieved through intergroup comparisons should 
produce higher levels of self-stereotyping. 
 For example, Haslam, Oakes, Turner and McGarty (1995) asked Australian 
students to judge only their ingroup in terms of stereotypic traits (i.e. an intragroup 
context) by indicating the percentage of Australians possessing a certain 
characteristic. Another group of students was asked to judge both the ingroup and an 
outgroup (Americans) in terms of stereotypic traits (i.e. an intergroup context). 
Results indicated that Australian students reported greater stereotypical homogeneity 
among Australians when they were judged in a context including Americans 
(intergroup context), than when judging Australians alone (intragroup context).  
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Similarly, Verkuyten and DeWolfe (2002) asked Chinese participants living in 
the Netherlands to rate themselves on eight traits stereotypic of Chinese (e.g. modest) 
either in comparison to their ethnic ingroup (Chinese) or in comparison to the 
majority outgroup (Dutch). Participants in the intragroup condition were asked on a 
bipolar scale (“me” / “not me”) to indicate how descriptive the traits were of them 
“compared to other Chinese.” Participants in the intergroup condition were asked on a 
bipolar scale (“us”/ “them”) to indicate how descriptive the traits were of them 
“compared to Dutch people.” Although overall results indicated higher self-
stereotyping in the intergroup context in comparison with the intragroup context, the 
effect was found only on half of the traits (emotionally controlled, reserved, modest 
and obedient; but not on respectful, composed, patient and having sense of duty).  
Onorato and Turner (2004) manipulated the comparative context by asking 
female participants to either think of the characteristics that they “have as an 
individual compared to other women” (intragroup) or to think of the characteristics 
that they “have as a woman compared to men” (intergroup). In the intragroup 
condition participants were given a list of characteristics and were asked to indicate, 
pressing a computer key, whether the trait was descriptive of them or not (“me” / “not 
me”). In the intergroup condition the same paradigm was used but instead of the “me” 
/ “not me” distinction, participants were asked to make “us” (if descriptive of them as 
a woman compared to men) versus “them” (if not descriptive of them as a woman 
compared to men) judgments. Their response time latencies were recorded. Results 
indicated that women self-stereotyped more in the intergroup condition in comparison 
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with the intragroup condition, by endorsing more feminine words as descriptive of 
“us.” Similarly, the response latencies indicated faster responses to feminine words 
than masculine words in the intergroup condition in comparison with the intragroup 
condition.  
 Although the self-description measures in the above studies were not 
explicitly operationalized as measuring self-stereotyping, conceptually they do map 
onto measures of self-stereotyping used in the literature (e.g. self-ratings on 
stereotypic ingroup attributes). Within the self-stereotyping literature there are studies 
that have also explicitly investigated self-stereotyping effects in intergroup and 
intragroup comparative context (Guimond et al., 2006; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991). For 
example, Guimond et al. (2006) manipulated the comparative context by asking 
participants to provide self-ratings on gender stereotypical traits, where all traits were 
preceded by the statement “compared to most men, I am” (intragroup for men; 
intergroup for women) or “compared to most women, I am” (intragroup for women; 
intergroup for men), or to no such comparative statement. Across three studies, 
gender differences were largest in the intergroup comparison condition, in 
comparison with the intragroup comparison and control conditions2. Thus, when men 
were asked to compare themselves to most women, they rated themselves as more 
agentic and less relational than when they were asked to compare themselves to most 
men. The reverse results were observed for women, with higher self-ratings on 
relational and lower on agentic dimensions when asked to compare themselves with 
most men than when asked to compare themselves with most women. These data are 
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consistent with the idea that an intergroup focus enhances differentiation between 
groups at the level of self-stereotyping. 
As can be seen in the research reviewed, the comparative context (intergroup 
or intragroup) is important for one’s self-descriptions. Intragroup contexts activate 
categorization on a personal level and intergroup contexts activate categorization on a 
social identity level. Self-descriptions in regard to both gender (Guimond et al., 2006; 
Onotaro & Turner, 2004) and ethnic identity (Haslam et al., 1995; Verkuyten & 
DeWolfe, 2002) have been shown to be more stereotypic in intergroup contexts (both 
the ingroup and a comparative outgroup are made salient) than in intragroup contexts 
(only the ingroup is made salient).  
With regard to self-stereotyping, Lorenzi-Cioldi (1991) proposed that the two 
types of contexts—intragroup and intergroup—might be differentially salient to 
women and men based on their gender groups’ position in the social hierarchy.  Due 
to the difference in social status between the genders, he hypothesized that women are 
more likely to engage in intergroup processing (which he labeled “gender-schema” 
processing) and men in intragroup processing (“group-schema” processing). The label 
“gender-schema” is based on Bem’s (1981) gender-schema theory, which suggests a 
readiness to encode and organize information in terms of a male-female dichotomous 
categorization. The label “group-schema” is based on Markus’ (1977) self-schema 
theory, which proposes that once one has developed a schema in a given domain, he 
or she becomes an “expert” in processing information related to that self-schema. For 
example, if a man has developed a masculinity self-schema, he becomes expert in 
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masculinity, but not in femininity as well. Therefore, group-schema processing 
activates an intragroup context, while gender-schema processing activates an 
intergroup schema.  
Participants in Lorenzi-Cioldi’s (1991) study were told that they would 
participate in a study “on similarities and differences between men and women” 
(designed to activate gender identity) or “on similarities and differences between 
individuals” (designed to activate personal identity). Participants were asked to 
respond to the sixty traits of the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI; Bem, 1974) using 
the “me” / “not me” paradigm on a computer. Response time latencies were recorded 
and speed of processing of stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent traits was 
analyzed. Being schematic was operationalized as processing consistent information 
more quickly than inconsistent information. From a gender-schema approach, 
consistent information is acceptance of stereotypes for one’s own sex and rejection of 
stereotypes for the other sex and inconsistent information is the opposite (acceptance 
of stereotypes for the opposite sex and rejection of stereotypes for own sex). From a 
group-schema approach, consistent information is acceptance and rejection of 
stereotypes for one’s own sex and inconsistent information is acceptance or rejection 
of stereotypes of the opposite sex. One uses a group-schema to the extent that he or 
she processes ingroup information faster than outgroup information. Thus, women, 
relative to men, should accept ingroup and reject outgroup stereotypes faster than the 
opposite (accept outgroup and reject ingroup stereotypes). Men, relative to women, 
should accept or reject ingroup stereotypes faster than outgroup stereotypes. Women 
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did show the hypothesized effect, accepting ingroup and rejecting outgroup 
stereotypes faster than the opposite, while men did not show any difference in 
reaction times to acceptance and rejection of ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. The 
effect for women was most pronounced when gender identity was activated.  
In short, Lorenzi-Cioldi’s (1991) hypothesis that men and women engage in 
different self-stereotyping processing was only partially confirmed: Women did 
display gender-schematic processing, but only in the intergroup comparison 
condition, and men did not display evidence of group-schematic processing. Since 
there are other differences among men and women besides status, the idea that men 
and women can engage in different self-stereotyping processes is suggestive of status 
difference, however it is not definitive on this point.  
Comparative context and group status 
Several other lines of research suggest that group status can have implications 
for cognitive processing, in particular for intergroup versus intragroup processing. For 
example, research has pointed to differences in mental representations for low status 
(dominated) and high status (dominant) social groups (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1995; Simon, 
2004) as well as perceptions of high status groups as “cultural default values” (e.g. 
Devos & Banaji, 2005; Smith & Zarate, 1992), and low status groups as those whose 
behavior or outcomes become “the effects to be explained” (e.g. Hegarty & Pratto, 
2001; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991).  
Lorenzi-Cioldi (1995) distinguishes between two types of groups: collections 
and aggregates. Collections are groups located at the top of the status hierarchy. 
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Members of these groups perceive themselves, and are perceived by others, as 
endowed with unique attributes. In other words, they are perceived as social 
categories consisting of distinctive individuals who are heterogeneous and never fully 
interchangeable, emphasizing their personal distinctiveness and differentiating within 
their ranks. In these dominant groups personal identity prevails. On the other hand, 
members of aggregates perceive themselves and are perceived by others as parts of a 
relative undifferentiated entity. They consist of individuals who are defined primarily 
in terms of holistic features that distinguish their group from other groups. Thus they 
are perceptually more homogeneous and interchangeable with one another. In these 
aggregate groups social identity is precedent. For example, men, because of their 
higher status, exemplify a collection group, while women, because of their lower 
status, exemplify an aggregate group (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1995). Lorenzi-Cioldi (2006) 
argues that the distinction between collection and aggregate groups has implications 
for the identity process, where the personal or social self-concept is constrained by 
the membership to the group to which one belongs. In high-status groups, self-
categorization on the group level leads to feelings of uniqueness, rather than 
depersonalization.  
 Simon (2004) proposes a similar distinction between social groups—
similarity-based versus complementariness-based (or interdependence -based) 
groups. Similarity-based groups are held together primarily by the similarities 
between their members; complementariness-based groups are held together primarily 
by their members’ individual, but complementary and interdependent roles. Members 
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of similarity-based groups are assumed to define themselves in terms of intergroup 
differentiation (e.g. Turner et al., 1987), and members of complementariness-based 
groups are assumed to emphasize intragroup relations (e.g. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988). 
Thus, Simon (2004) argues that members of minority groups may cognitively 
construe their ingroup more in terms of the former type (similarity-based), but 
members of majorities may construe their ingroup more in terms of the latter type 
(complementariness-based). Thus, social identity may take on somewhat different 
meaning for members of both types of groups, because “it may not necessarily be 
majority members’ mutual interchangeability that is highlighted, as is usually the case 
for minority members” (p. 116).  
 What Lorenzi-Cioldi (2006) and Simon (2004) suggest is that status can 
underlie different cognitive processing of ingroup members. High status and majority 
members experience themselves more in terms of their individuating characteristics 
even when their group identity is salient, which in turn leads to intragroup processing. 
Low status and minority members experience themselves more in terms of 
interchangeability with other ingroup members when their group identity is salient, 
which, consistent with the metacontrast principle (Turner, 1985), leads to intergroup 
processing. It is intergroup processing that is more likely to give rise to self-
stereotyping. 
Research on “cultural default values” further suggests that members of 
different groups are subject to either intergroup or intragroup processing. In their 
exemplar-based model of social judgment, Smith and Zarate (1992) posit that within 
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a culture, particular persons’ attributes may come to be perceived as the expected or 
default values. For example, in Western culture, it is male gender, White racial 
identity, heterosexuality and young age that are treated as the cultural expectations, 
assumed to characterize a person, unless some other information is provided. Based 
on this assumption of cultural defaults, departure from the expected attribute should 
draw more attention and be the basis for categorizing a target person. In other words, 
members of groups that do not map onto the cultural default will be categorized 
according to the characteristics that do not map onto the default values. For example, 
since a Black male deviates from the “White norm,” he will be categorized according 
to that deviation, as “Black” rather than “male.”  
 Smith and Zarate’s (1992) model is also consistent with research showing 
greater consistency between stereotypes of men and their nationalities than women 
and their nationalities (Eagly & Kite, 1987). Stereotypes of men, women, and 
nationalities of 28 countries were examined to determine the extent to which 
stereotypes of nationalities are applied to both genders. Results indicated that 
stereotypes of men resembled stereotypes of nationalities more than did stereotypes 
of women3. Similarly, with regard to ethnic groups in the United States, Devos and 
Banaji (2005) found that White Americans were more likely to be thought of as 
prototypical or representative of the category “American” than any other ethnic 
group, as measured both at the explicit and implicit level. Similarly, Huo and Molina 
(2006) argued that for members of the dominant group (e.g., Whites), their 
relationship with Americans occurs in an intragroup context (between individuals and 
 32 
their ingroup), while for ethnic minorities, their relationship with Americans occurs in 
an intergroup context (between their ethnic group and a common group defined 
primarily by Whites).  
 The idea that certain groups, due to their position in the social hierarchy, serve 
as a norm against which other groups compare, is not new to psychology. For 
example, Deschamps (1982) argues that those having high status and power set the 
standard of the culturally valued behavior against which others define themselves. As 
Guillaumin puts it: “The minority cannot define itself in terms of criteria that are 
internal to it and independent, it must do this starting from points of reference which 
are offered to it by the majority system” (quoted by Moscovici & Paicheler, 1978, p. 
265).  
 Further evidence of the impact of “cultural default values” emerges from 
research on role of category norms in lay explanations (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; 
Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991). Building upon norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986), which describes how stimuli and category labels create implicit norms, which 
in turn bring their own frames of reference into being, Hegarty and Pratto (2001) 
propose that in intergroup relations, category norms define which of two groups 
becomes “the effect to be explained.” Stereotypes then shape attributions about that 
group. Across three studies, Hegarty and Pratto (2001) found that participants’ 
explanations of the difference between gay and straight men focused more on gay 
men than straight men. While straight men’s attributes were seen as less mutable than 
those of gay men, the references to gay men attributes were heavily influenced by 
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stereotypes. Explanations focused on gay men when straight men were the majority 
and when straight men were more typical of the social category within which the 
groups were compared. However, explanations focused equally on gay and straight 
men when gay men were more typical of the social category (e.g. people with AIDS) 
and when they were the majority. Consistent with previous research (Miller et al., 
1991) this research shows that category typicality influences the choice of the group 
to be explained (e.g. gay men), but this effect is also influenced by the relative group 
sized (e.g. the minority is to be explained).  
 This line of research suggests that for members of both low and high status 
groups, members of the high status groups provide the standard or norm against 
which they will be compared. The implication is that when one’s category 
membership is made salient, different processing will result depending on status. 
Members of low status groups will engage in intergroup comparisons, comparing 
themselves with the “norm,” while members of high status group will engage in 
intragroup comparison, also comparing themselves to the “norm,” which, in this case 
is other ingroup members. For example, when women are asked to self-evaluate in 
the context of intergroup relations, they will define themselves in comparison with 
men (intergroup comparison). Men will also compare to men, but this results in a 
fully intragroup, not intergroup, process.  
Comparative context and “default” processing 
Consistent with these perspectives, I propose that due to status differentials 
between groups, the “default” mode of processing when one’s group identity becomes 
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salient is different for different groups. The “default” processing for high status 
groups is intragroup and for low status groups is intergroup. Thus, when the racial 
identity of a White person is salient, the default comparison will be within group; for 
a Black person it will be between groups. Based on self-categorization theory (Turner 
et al., 1987) self-stereotyping occurs only as a result of intergroup processing. 
Therefore, low status group members will be more likely to self-stereotype in 
“default” conditions than high status group members.  
One important clarification needs to be made here: The proposed relationship 
between group status and differential processing in self-stereotyping is applicable 
only to naturally occurring groups, not groups created by using the minimal group 
paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). In the minimal group paradigm participants are 
randomly assorted into two groups based on alleged preference (e.g. for two different 
painters), performance on a task (e.g. estimating the number of dots on a slide) or 
score on a personality measure (e.g. introverted / extroverted). However, participants 
are always aware of the existence of the other group; it is as salient as the group they 
were sorted into, and thus the comparative context that is primed is intergroup in 
nature. Other researchers have made distinctions between natural occurring groups 
and groups created in the laboratory. For example, Ostrom and Sedikides (1992) 
found that outgroup homogeneity effects are stronger in natural than minimal groups. 
Based on the discussed distinction between collection and aggregate groups, Lorenzi-
Cioldi (1995) argued that groups created based on the minimal group paradigm 
represent collection groups, which in turn has implications for information 
 35 
processing. My prediction that intergroup processing is the default among low status 
members applies to naturally occurring groups, but not to groups created in the lab. 
Revisiting self-stereotyping studies: Evidence for intergroup and intragroup 
processing in self-stereotyping 
 Examining the results from several self-stereotyping studies lends support to 
the claim that group status matters for intragroup and intergroup processing. For 
example, Guimond et al. (2006) found that when men and women were asked to 
compare themselves to members of the opposite gender their self-ratings on relational 
and agentic dimensions were more assimilated to the ingroup stereotypes (men higher 
on agency and lower on relationality; women higher on relationality and lower on 
agency), than when they were asked to compare themselves to members of their 
ingroup. However, in the control condition (Study 2), in which men and women were 
not given any explicit comparison instructions, results supported differential 
processing in men and women. On relational items, women provided almost identical 
self-ratings in the intergroup (M = 5.60) comparison and control conditions (M = 
5.64), and men provided almost identical self-ratings in the intragroup (M = 4.94) 
and control conditions (M = 4.93). The same effect appeared in self-ratings on agentic 
items; men’s self-ratings in the control (M = 3.12) and intragroup (M = 3.05) 
condition were very similar as were women’s in the control (M = 3.12) and 
intergroup (M = 3.65) condition. Therefore, although men and women both respond 
to explicit instructions to engage in intergroup comparisons by self-stereotyping, 
unprompted self-evaluations reveal different patterns for women and men. 
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Unprompted, women exhibit the same pattern as women in the intergroup comparison 
and men exhibit the same pattern as men in the intragroup condition (see also 
Guimond et al., 2006, Study 3). Unfortunately, none of the other studies I have 
reviewed that explicitly manipulated the comparative context included control 
conditions (Haslam et al., 1995; Onorato & Turner, 2004; Verkuyten & DeWolfe, 
2002). And one of these studies only included female participants, further limiting its 
relevance to the differential processing hypothesis (Onorato and Turner, 2004).  
But Simon et al.’s (1991) study on self-stereotyping of gay and straight men 
shows further support for my theorizing. Self-stereotyping was assessed by both self-
ratings on stereotypic attributes and perceptions of ingroup homogeneity. Both 
measures showed that gay men self-stereotyped more than straight men—they 
perceived more ingroup homogeneity than straight men and self-endorsed both 
negative and positive stereotyped traits. Comparative context was not manipulated, 
thus this study captures gay and straight men’s “default” processing mode. The 
results are consistent with the argument that gay men engaged in intergroup 
comparison, and subsequently self-stereotyped more, whereas straight men were 
more likely to engage in intragroup processing and did not self-stereotype to the same 
degree.  
Overview of Empirical Studies 
 The present research involves four studies addressing several issues. First, this 
research examines whether different “default” comparative processes are activated for 
members of high and low status groups; intergroup for low status group members and 
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intragroup for high status group members. This issue is examined both within the 
framework of gender (Studies 1, 3 and 4) and sexual orientation (Study 2).  
 Second, this research examines whether differential “default” comparative 
processes, as a result of one’s social status membership, lead to more pronounced 
self-stereotyping effects for members of low status groups in comparison with 
members of high status groups. Multiple measures of self-stereotyping are used 
ranging from explicit (e.g. perceived prototypicality, homogeneity and trait ratings) to 
implicit (e.g. reaction times to ingroup stereotypic and counter-stereotypic traits). 
Third, I address whether explicit manipulations of the comparative context affect 
these patterns, with women moving to an intragroup mode and men moving to an 
intergroup mode when explicitly instructed to do so (Studies 3 and 4).  
Study 1 
 Study 1 was designed as an initial investigation of the effect of social status on 
comparative processes, and in turn on self-stereotyping, within the framework of 
gender. Male and female participants were asked to describe “what it means to you to 
be a man/woman” and to complete several measures of self-stereotyping, including 
self-ratings on a series of gender stereotypical traits and perceived ingroup 
prototypicality. 
 Two predictions were made for Study 1. First, because women are relatively 
lower in social status than men, thinking about being a woman should also activate 
the outgroup category “men” – more so than will the outgroup category “women” be 
activated for men. That is, women, in comparison to men, will be more likely to 
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mention the opposite gender, when they are describing what it means to them to be a 
woman. Furthermore, since women are the culturally lower status group, gender is 
more chronically salient; in turn women will be more likely to mention their own 
gender when describing what it means for them to be a woman as well. Second, 
women will perceive themselves as more prototypical of their gender and rate 
themselves higher on stereotypical ingroup traits and lower on counter-stereotypical 
traits in comparison with men. 
 Furthermore, research on self-stereotyping has shown that identification with 
one’s group moderates the self-stereotyping effects, such that high identified group 
members self-stereotype more than low identified group members. My prediction is 
that members who highly identify with their gender group should mention the same 
and opposite gender more often and self-stereotype more than members who are less 
highly-identified; this effect should be particularly strong for women (e.g. Doosje, 
Ellemers, & Spears, 1999).  
Method 
Participants and Procedure. Participants were 57 undergraduates (28 males 
and 29 females) at the University of Kansas who were enrolled in introductory 
psychology courses. Participants completed an online survey and received partial 
course credit for their participation. The ethnic make-up was predominantly White 
(71.2%). Based on their gender, participants completed a female or male version of an 
online survey.  
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Dependent Measures. Participants first completed items measuring in-group 
identification, using the group-level self-investment subscale from Leach et al. 
(2008). The subscale consisted of ten items such as “I feel a bond with women/men” 
and “I am glad to be a woman/man” (α = .84)4.  Participants responded on scales 
ranging from 1 (no, not at all) to 7 (yes, definitely). The complete list of questions is 
presented in Appendix A.  
Participants next were asked to generate free responses following the 
instructions below. These were based on procedures used by Biernat et al. (1996) to 
activate a social category:  
“Think about all the things that come to you as a result of your being a 
woman/man—think about both the physical and emotional outcomes of 
belonging to this important group. Think of how it feels to be a woman/man. 
We would like you to also reflect on what other accomplishments women/men 
have made—in academics, athletics, politics, etc. Also think about how your 
gender group is viewed by other people. In the provided space, please write at 
least five things about what it means to you to be a woman /man.”  
After responding to these instructions, participants were asked to rate 
themselves on nineteen traits, nine stereotypical male traits (e.g. confident, 
insensitive) and ten stereotypical female traits (e.g. weak, compassionate). 
Participants responded on scales ranging from 1 (never or almost never true) to 7 
(always or almost always true). The traits were drawn from Sinclair and Huntsinger 
(2005); the full list is presented in Appendix A.  These same traits were used across 
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three of the studies (Studies 1, 3 and 4). Factor analyses using a varimax rotation on 
self-ratings from each of these studies revealed three factors (based on eigenvalues 
greater than one): warmth, including compassionate, sweet, caring, sensitive and 
faithful; strength, including weak (reverse scored), strong, attractive and confident; 
competitiveness, including athletic and competitive. The reliabilities for the three 
factors for Study 1 were, warmth (α = .78), strength (α = .87) and competitiveness (α 
= .73). Individual factor analyses were run on trait rating data from Studies 1, 3, and 4 
and traits were excluded based on cross-loadings on multiple factors (sad, shy, 
aggressive, and intelligent) or because they were single-item factors (insensitive, 
arrogant, outspoken and calm). 
Participants next completed two items from Spears et al. (1997) measuring 
their perceptions of prototypicality: “I am different from the average woman / man” 
(reverse scored) and “I am similar to the average woman / man.” Participants 
responded on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (yes, definitely). The correlation 
between these two items was .90.  Finally, participants provided basic demographic 
information and read a debriefing statement. 
Results 
 The key predictions of Study 1 were that: 1) in the free responses, the 
outgroup gender would be mentioned more often for women than for men and 2) 
women would self-stereotype more than men (both on trait ratings and perceptions of 
prototypicality). In order to test these predictions, a series of Analyses of Variance 
(ANOVAs) were computed, in which participant gender was the sole between-
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participants factor (and in some cases, a repeated factor was included). To examine 
the effects of identification, a series of regression analyses were also computed.  
 Free responses. The main variable of interest was free responses to the 
question about the meaning of being a man or a woman. These were coded by two 
independent raters blind to the hypotheses of the study. Across all of a given 
participant’s responses, coders rated whether participants mentioned their own gender 
(κ = .96) and the opposite gender (κ = .94), and whether they used same-gender 
stereotypes to describe themselves (κ = .56); there were no mentions of opposite-
gender stereotypes so these were not coded). A third rater reconciled any differences. 
Mentioning same-, opposite-, and same-gender stereotypes was coded as 1, and the 
lack of mention was coded as 0. For example, a female participant wrote: “Being a 
woman means not getting paid as much as men. Being a woman means to have to 
look professionally and “put together” all the time. Being a woman means to 
experience the wonder and pleasure of having a baby.” Her response was coded as 1 
for mentioning own gender, 1 for mentioning opposite gender, and 0 for mention of 
same-gender stereotypes.  A male participant wrote: “smart, strong, reliable, 
respectable.” His response was coded as 0 for mentioning own gender, 0 for 
mentioning opposite gender, and 1 for same-gender stereotypes.  
 A mixed-model ANOVA with mentions of same and opposite gender as the 
within-subject variable and gender as between-subjects variable, revealed a 
significant participant gender effect, F(1, 52) = 6.16,  p = .02, and a marginally 
significant main effect of group mentioned, F(1, 52) = 3.06, p = .09, but no 
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significant interaction, F(1, 52) = .004, p = .95. Nonetheless, t-tests revealed that 
women mentioned the opposite gender (M = .54, SD = .51) more often than did men 
(M = .27, SD = .45), t(52) = -2.03, p < .05. Women also tended to mention their own 
gender (M = .43, SD = .50) more often than did men (M = .15, SD = .37), t(52) = - 
2.27, p = .03. Thus for women in comparison with men, both the ingroup and 
outgroup category showed more evidence of activation (see Figure 1).   
 A univariate ANOVA on spontaneous mention of ingroup gender stereotypes 
produced a main effect of gender, F(1, 52) = 9.63, p = .003. Men (M = .96, SD = .20) 
mentioned ingroup stereotypic characteristics more often than women did (M = .64, 
SD = .49)5. 
 Prototypicality. A univariate ANOVA on the prototypicality measure showed 
a marginal gender effect, F(1,56) = 2.96, p = .09.Consistent with predictions, women 
(M = 4.21, SD = 1.46) rated themselves as more prototypical members of their gender 
group than did men (M = 3.54, SD = 1.48).  
Traits.  A mixed-model ANOVA with the three trait factors (warmth, 
strength, competitiveness) as a within-subject variable and gender as a between-
subjects variable, revealed a significant interaction, F(2, 54) = 10.12, p < .001. 
Independent t-tests revealed a significant gender effect for warmth, t(55) = -2.15, p = 
.04 and competitiveness, t(55) = 3.84, p < .001, but not for strength, t(55) = .729, p > 
.45. As can be seen in Figure 2, women rated themselves higher on warmth (M = 
5.92, SD = .71) than men (M = 5.49, SD = .80), whereas men rated themselves higher 
on competitiveness (M = 5.86, SD = 1.04) than women (M = 4.62, SD = 1.37). Paired-
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samples t-tests revealed that the difference between warmth and competitiveness was 
significant for women, t(28) = 5.24, p < .001, but only approached significance for 
men, t(27) = -1.82, p = .08. That is, women judged themselves significantly more 
warm than competitive, whereas men judged themselves relatively equally on these 
two dimensions. These data are consistent with predictions, as self-ratings were more 
consistent with gender stereotypes for women than men.  
  Regression Analyses Examining the Role of Ingroup Identification. A t-test 
indicated that men (M = 4.93, SD = .89) and women (M = 5.29, SD = .82) did not 
differentially identify with their gender group, t(55) = -1.57, p = .12. In order to 
investigate the effects of identification on comparative processing and self-
stereotyping, I performed multiple regressions for all dependent variables, with 
identification and gender as predictors. The categorical predictor of gender was 
dummy coded, where males were coded 0 and females were coded 1. The continuous 
predictor of identification was centered in order to avoid the statistical 
multicollinearity resulting from the inclusion of an interaction term into the model.  
 In separate regressions for free responses (mentions of same and opposite 
gender and same-gender stereotypes) and for trait ratings, the previously reported 
effects of gender remained: For mentions of the same gender, B = .25, t(53) = 1.96, p 
= .06, for mentions of the opposite gender, B = .25, t(53) = 1.80, p = .08, for same-
gender stereotypes B = -.30, t(53) = -2.79, p < .01, for competitiveness, B = -1.33, 
t(53) = -4.09, p < .001, and for warmth, B = .36, t(53) = 1.80, p = .08. The only case 
in which identification played any moderating role was in judgments of 
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prototypicality. The Gender X Identification interaction was significant, B = -1.00, 
t(53) = -2.58, p = .01, and is graphically displayed in Figure 3, using levels of 
identification set at one SD above and below the mean. Using Preacher, Curran, and 
Bauer’s (2006) computational tools for probing interaction effect in multiple linear 
regression, a significant effect of identification on perceived prototypicality was 
revealed for female participants, B = -.54, t(28) = -1.92, p = .05. Contrary to previous 
research findings (e.g. Spears et al., 1997) and current predictions, women who 
identified more highly with their group tended to see themselves as less prototypical. 
For men, identification marginally predicted prototypicality in the predicted direction, 
B = .46, t(27) = 1.73, p = .09. Men and women who identified more with their gender 
group did not differ in their perceived prototypicality, B = -.32, t(55) = -.58, p = .56, 
but men and women who identified less with their gender group differed in their 
perceived prototypicality, B = 1.69, t(55) = 3.07, p = .003, with low identified women 
judging themselves more prototypical than low identified men. 
Discussion 
 The results from Study 1 provide initial support for the differential “default” 
comparative processes as a result of one’s group status. Women in comparison to men 
were more likely to mention their own, as well as the opposite gender when 
describing what it means for them to be a member of their gender group. This 
supports the notion that for women—perhaps because of their relatively lower 
status—thinking about themselves as members of their gender group invoked an 
intergroup comparison, activating concepts of both “women” and “men.” This was 
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not the case for men. As members of a higher status group, the outgroup category 
“women” was less likely to be activated when thinking about themselves as members 
of their gender. 
But the free responses also revealed an unexpected pattern of self-
stereotyping; men were more likely than women to spontaneously mention 
stereotypes of their gender (e.g. provider, leader, strong). This same pattern will also 
appear in Studies 2 and 3 (with members of the higher status group describing 
themselves in more stereotypic terms than the members of the lower status group); 
therefore I will delay further discussion until the General Discussion section.  
 In terms of the other measures of self-stereotyping (perceived prototypicality 
and ratings on stereotypical and counter-stereotypical traits), women did show the 
predicted effects. Women perceived themselves to be more similar to other women 
than men did, and women rated themselves to be warmer and less competitive than 
men. Although men did rate themselves as more competitive and less warm than 
women, the difference between their ratings of warmth and competitiveness was not 
as pronounced as in the case of women.  
 Identification with one’s gender group moderated the effect on perceived 
prototypicality for women and to a lesser extent for men. Surprisingly and contrary to 
previous findings (e.g. Spears et al., 1997) low identified women perceived 
themselves as more prototypical than highly identified women. The reason for this 
finding is unclear, and across the four studies presented here, this is the only case in 
which a significant negative correlation between identification and prototypicality 
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appears for any group. One explanation could be that this effect is a result of the 
difference in content of the gender category for different female participants.  The 
content of the category “woman” can vary (e.g. traditional, feminist, etc), and the 
relationship between identification and prototypicality can vary as a result of the 
content of the gender category. For example, feminist women might highly identify 
with their gender group but not see themselves as similar to the prototype (i.e. 
traditional woman). Thus, if the current sample did consist of more non-traditional 
women, higher levels of identification would not be necessarily predictive of higher 
perceptions of prototypicality. I will continue to examine the effects of identification 
in Studies 2-4. 
Study 2 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to further investigate the proposed effect of status 
on comparative processes and self-stereotyping by focusing on a different social 
category with status implications: gay versus straight men. Participants were asked to 
write a free response to a question asking “what it means to be a gay/straight man,” 
and to complete self-ratings on traits associated with sexual orientation, and perceived 
ingroup prototypicality.  
 Two predictions were made for Study 2. First, gay participants will be more 
likely to mention the outgroup category “straight men” when they describe 
themselves in terms of their sexual orientation (compared to straight men’s mention 
of “gay men”). Second, gay participants will be more likely to self-stereotype; they 
will perceive themselves as more similar to other ingroup members, perceive their 
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ingroup as more homogeneous, and endorse more stereotypical gay traits. The 
potential moderating effect of identification is investigated here as well; I predict that 
those who highly identify with their sexual orientation group will be more likely to 
mention the outgroup and to self-stereotype compared to the less highly-identified, 
and this effect will be particularly strong for gay men.  
Method 
 Participants and Procedure. Participants were 43 undergraduates at the 
University of Kansas who were enrolled in introductory psychology courses (40 
straight, 1 gay), and 15 people recruited through MySpace and several other web-
sources that had a membership of men identifying themselves as gay. The ethnic 
make up was predominantly White (82.3%). Undergraduate male participants were 
prescreened for self-reported sexual orientation, and both straight and gay men were 
run in groups of one to four per session. Since only 1.4% of pool participants 
identified themselves as gay, I recruited additional participants by creating a web- 
based version of the study and contacting people belonging to an organization 
offering support to gay people (e.g. Lesbian and Gay Community Center of Kansas 
City) and through MySpace. 
 Dependent Measures. Similar to Study 1, participants first were asked to 
generate free responses to the instructions below:  
 Think about all the things that come to you as a result of you being a 
gay/straight man—think about both the physical and emotional outcomes of 
belonging to this important group. Think of how it feels to be a gay/straight 
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man. We would like you to also reflect on what other accomplishments 
gay/straight men have made—in academics, athletics, politics, etc. Also think 
about how your sexual orientation is viewed by other people. In the provided 
space, please write about what it means to you to be a gay/straight man.  
Participants next completed items measuring identification with the relevant 
ingroup (gay men/straight men), using the same group-level self-investment subscale 
(α = .76) as in Study 1 as well as the group-level definitions subscales (individual 
self-stereotyping (α = .93) and in-group homogeneity (α = .88)) from Leach et al. 
(2008).  
Participants were then asked to rate their ingroup and then themselves on 
twenty-two traits, eleven stereotypical gay traits (e.g. artistic, sensitive) and eleven 
stereotypical straight traits (e.g. masculine, aggressive). These traits were generated 
from previous research on stereotypes of gay men (Herek, 2002; Kite & Deaux, 1987; 
Madon, 1997; Taylor, 1983).  Participants responded on scales ranging from 1 (never 
or almost never true) to 7 (always or almost always true).  The complete list of traits 
used is presented in Appendix B.  
Factor analysis of the trait self-ratings revealed five factors: assertiveness (α = 
.82), including impatient, forceful, competitive, and assertive; strength (α = .82), 
including strong, tough and dominating; complains (α = .67), including 
hypersensitive, whiny, and catty; social weakness (α = .66), including competent 
(reverse scored), promiscuous, timid and inattentive; sensitivity (α = .81), including 
expressive, compassionate, emotional, and sensitive. Based on the factor analysis 
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three traits were excluded: independent because of cross-loadings, masculine and 
artistic because of single-loaded factors. The same five factors were created for the 
ratings of gay and straight men in general, in order to examine whether gay and 
straight men share the same stereotypes about both groups.  
Participants next completed a measure that was designed to assess 
stereotyping at a more subtle level. Based on the Linguistic Category Model (Semin 
& Fiedler, 1988), the measure involved presenting participants with  twelve drawings,  
each of which depicted a primary figure (indicated with the letter “P” in each 
drawing) that was accompanied by four response options to characterize P based on 
the LCM (e.g. Descriptive Action Verb [DAV]: the gay man vacuums the rug; 
Interpretive Action Verb [IAV]: the gay man cleans his home; State Verb [SV]: the 
gay man likes order; Adjective [ADJ]: the gay man is neat). Adjectives are the most 
abstract categorizations of actions; DAVs are the most concrete. Past research has 
shown that stereotypic traits are more likely to be described abstractly than non-
stereotypic traits (Maass, Montalcni, & Bociotti, 1998; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & 
Semin, 1989). In this version of the procedure, half of the targets were described as 
gay men; half as straight men (the comparable statements for the straight targets 
began with the man). Participants were asked to please read each option and pick the 
one (a, b, c, or d) that seems to best fit the primary figure.  The four descriptive 
options were randomly varied across drawings. The descriptions were scored for 
abstraction as follows: DAV=1, IAV=2, SV=3, ADJ=4. Half of the drawings depicted 
“gay relevant” actions (being artistic, expressive and compassionate, hypersensitive, 
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timid and drag queen). The other half of the drawings depicted “straight relevant” 
actions (being physically tough, masculine and strong, impatient, dominating and 
inattentive). These drawings and the corresponding descriptions were adapted from 
Emerson (2007), and are presented in Appendix B. I expected that gay and straight 
men would describe gay targets more abstractly on the “gay relevant” actions and 
straight targets more abstractly on the “straight relevant” actions.  
Participants then rated the outgroup on the same set of twenty-two traits 
described above.  Next, participants’ perceptions of the social status of gay males 
were assessed by the question “Do you think that gay men have lower status in 
society than straight men?” (yes=1/no=0)6 and their political ideology on a scale 
ranging from 1 (very conservative) to 7 (very liberal)7. Finally, participants provided 
basic demographic information. 
Results 
The key predictions of Study 2 were that: 1) in the free responses, the 
outgroup would be mentioned more often for gay than for straight men and 2) gay 
participants would self-stereotype more than men (both on trait ratings and 
perceptions of prototypicality and homogeneity). In order to test these predictions, a 
series of Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were computed, in which participant 
sexual orientation was the between-participants factors (and in some cases, a repeated 
factor was included). To examine the effects of identification, a series of regression 
analyses were also computed.  
 51 
Free responses. The free responses were coded by two independent raters 
blind to the hypotheses of the study. The coding included whether participants 
mentioned their own sexual orientation (κ = .91), the opposite sexual orientation (κ = 
.70), and same sexual orientation stereotypes (κ = .50). A third rater reconciled any 
differences. Mentioning same-, opposite-, and same-sexual orientation stereotypes 
was coded as 1, and the lack of mention was coded as 0. For example, a gay 
participant wrote: 
I feel separated and guarded. The awareness of being a gay man has made me 
more sensitive to other people's feelings, more compassionate. I have allowed 
myself to be weakened and compromised, still locked up in feelings of 
inadequacy. I see in retrospect that I could have come out sooner and spent a 
much happier life, allowing myself to be honest and loving. I've seized on 
being pseudo-intellectual as a compromise for never allowing myself to be 
athletic, and have spent so much of my life retreating that I know I have 
denied myself a lot of the world. 
 His response was coded as 1 for mentioning own sexual orientation (e.g. being 
a gay man…) and 0 for mentioning the opposite sexual orientation, and 1 for same 
sexual orientation stereotypes (e.g. compassionate, never allowing myself to be 
athletic…).  
 A mixed-model ANOVA with mentions of same and opposite sexual 
orientation as the within-subject variable and sexual orientation as between-subjects 
variable revealed a main effect of sexual orientation, F(1, 54) = 7.20, p = .01, a 
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significant main effect of group mentioned, F(1, 54) = 34.04, p < .001, but no 
interaction, F(1, 54) = 1.06, p = .31. Nonetheless, t-tests revealed that straight men 
mentioned their own sexual orientation (M = .97, SD = .16) more often than did gay 
men (M = .81, SD = .40), t(54) = 2.19, p = .03. Straight men also tended to mention 
gay men (M = .63, SD = .49) more often than gay men mentioned straight men (M = 
.31, SD = .48), t(54) = 2.17, p = .04 (see Figure 4). Contrary to my prediction, straight 
men were more likely to mention both the ingroup and outgroup categories.  
A univariate ANOVA on spontaneous mention of ingroup stereotypes 
revealed a main effect of sexual orientation, F(1, 55) = 4.44, p = .04. Straight men (M 
= .68, SD = .47) mentioned ingroup stereotypic characteristics more often than gay 
men did (M = .38, SD = .50)8. This finding is similar to that of Study 1, where the 
members of the high status group (men) were more likely to use ingroup stereotypic 
traits as more self-descriptive than members of the lower status group (women).  
Prototypicality and homogeneity. ANOVAs revealed a main effect of sexual 
orientation on prototypicality, F(1,52) = 13.85, p < .001, but no effect on 
homogeneity F(1,52) = 1.88, p = .18. Contrary to my predictions, it was straight men 
(M = 5.65, SD = 1.11) who rated themselves as more prototypical members of their 
sexual orientation group than gay men (M = 4.16, SD = 1.84).  For homogeneity, 
although the effect was not statistically significant, the means were in same direction 
as prototypicality, with straight men (M = 4.44, SD = 1.47) perceiving more 
homogeneity than gay men (M = 3.81, SD = 1.71). 
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 Traits. A mixed-model ANOVA with the five trait factors (assertiveness, 
strength, complains, social weakness and expressiveness) as a within-subjects 
variable and sexual-orientation and LCM target as between-subjects variables 
revealed a main effect of trait dimension, F(4,49) = 46.14, p < .001, which was 
further qualified by the trait X sexual orientation interaction, F(4,49) = 11.53, p < 
.001.  Independent t-tests revealed a significant sexual orientation effect for 
assertiveness, t(54) = 3.14, p = .003, strength, t(54) = 2.70, p = .01, social weakness, 
t(54) = 3.84, p < .001, and sensitivity, t(54) = -3.86, p < .001 but not for complains, 
t(54) = -.66, p = .51. As can be seen in Table 1, gay men rated themselves lower on 
assertiveness, strength, and social weakness, and higher on sensitivity than straight 
men. These patterns are consistent with self-stereotyping, in that gay men attributed 
more “gay-relevant” traits to themselves than straight men did.  
 Ingroup and outgroup stereotyping. The ingroup and outgroup ratings 
revealed gay and straight men endorsing the same stereotypes for gay and straight 
men (see Table 1). Target sexual orientation X participant sexual orientation 
ANOVAs on each trait factor revealed significant target effects, ps < .05. There were 
several interactions, revealing that straight men rated gay men lower in assertiveness 
and strength and higher in complains and sensitivity than gay men did (as a group). In 
other words, straight men rated gay men lower on straight relevant stereotypes and 
higher on gay relevant stereotypes than gay men did. Gay men rated straight men as 
possessing less strength, complains, and sensitivity but more social weakness than 
straight men did (as a group). Despite these mean differences in perceptions between 
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groups, the directions of the means were consistent with the cultural stereotypes about 
straight and gay men – members of both groups endorsed stereotypes of both groups.  
 Similarly, for the LCM measure a mixed-design ANOVA with LCM trait type 
(gay vs. straight) as the within-subjects variable and sexual orientation  and LCM 
target (gay vs. straight) as the between subject variables, revealed an LCM trait type 
X LCM target interaction, F(1, 52) = 6.86, p = .01. The interaction revealed that gay 
targets were rated in more abstract terms on the gay stereotypic actions and straight 
men were rated in more abstract terms on the straight stereotypic actions (see Table 
2). These effects show evidence of shared stereotyping of gay and straight men, but 
because they were not moderated by participants’ own sexual orientation, they will 
not be discussed further. 
Regression Analyses Examining the Role of Ingroup Identification 
 A t-test indicated that gay (M = 5.49, SD = 1.24) and straight (M = 5.43, SD = 
.69) participants did not differentially identify with their sexual orientation group. In 
order to investigate the effects of identification on self-stereotyping, I performed 
multiple regressions for all dependent variables, with identification, sexual 
orientation, and their interaction as predictors. The categorical predictor of sexual 
orientation was dummy coded, where straight men were coded 0 and gay men were 
coded 1. The continuous predictor of identification was centered in order to avoid the 
statistical multicollinearity resulting from the inclusion of interaction terms into the 
model.  
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 In the analysis of prototypicality, the previously reported sexual orientation 
effect remained significant, B = -1.56, t(52) = -4.95, p < .001. Additionally, there was 
a main effect of identification, B = .43, t(48) = 2.02, p = .05, and a Sexual orientation 
X Identification interaction, B = .66, t(52) = 2.31, p = .03. As can be seen in Figure 5, 
identification predicted increased prototypicality for both gay, B = 1.10, t(15) = 5.76, 
p < .001 and straight men, B = .43, t(39) = 2.02, p = .05, but the effect was stronger 
among gay men. Gay and straight men who identified less with their sexual 
orientation group differed in their perceived prototypicality, B = -2.21, t(54) = -5.21, 
p < .001, as did gay and straight men who identified more with their sexual 
orientation, B = -.89, t(54) = -2.08, p = .04, but the effect of sexual orientation was 
greatest at low levels of identification. For homogeneity, there was a significant main 
effect of identification, B = .87, t(54) = 3.15, p < .01. Regardless of sexual orientation 
more highly identified group members perceived more homogeneity. There were no 
other moderating effects of identification on any of the other variables, all ps > .13. 
Discussion 
Results from Study 2 provide some evidence for self-stereotyping: Gay and 
straight men rated themselves higher on characteristics that are stereotypic of their 
own groups (gay men were higher in sensitivity and lower in assertiveness and 
strength relative to straight men). Although the social weakness factor (incompetent, 
promiscuous, timid and inattentive) encompassed characteristics conceptualized as 
being more stereotypical of gay men (Herek, 2002; Peplau, 1991), these items were 
endorsed more strongly by straight men than gay men (the overall mean was rather 
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low for straight men as well). The data also provide evidence for group-level 
stereotyping: Gay and straight men similarly endorsed stereotypes of gay and straight 
men, producing results that paralleled the self-descriptions. And the LCM measure 
revealed use of abstract language by both gay and straight men to characterize gay 
men’s gay-relevant actions and straight men’s straight-relevant actions. 
However, most of the results were contrary to my predictions. It was straight 
men, not gay men, who mentioned the outgroup more often in their free descriptions 
and perceived themselves as highly prototypical of their group. There were no 
differences in perceived homogeneity. Identification played a moderating role only in 
judgments of prototypicality. It was the case that identification had a stronger effect 
on gay men’s than straight men’s perceived prototypicality, but it is unclear why the 
difference between gay and straight men was strongest among those least identified 
with their group.  
One explanation for the finding that straight men mentioned the outgroup 
more often than gay men is that the category “men” can elicit different relevant 
outgroups depending on the context (e.g. women or gay men). However, the category 
“straight men” introduces a context in which the relevant outgroup is gay men. In 
other words, when men think of themselves as men, the heterosexual aspect of their 
identity might always be activated, but using the phrase “straight men” makes this 
particularly likely. In short, my use of the modifier “straight” may have made the 
intergroup context more salient for this group of heterosexual men. 
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The finding that straight men perceived themselves as more prototypical than 
gay men is puzzling. A study by Simon, Pantaleo and Mummenday (1995) may offer 
some explanation. These authors found that on ratings of similarity and difference 
between the self and the ingroup and outgroup, gay men tended to show no difference 
in perceived similarity between the self and ingroup and self and outgroup. However, 
straight men rated themselves as more similar to their ingroup than to their outgroup. 
In another study, gay participants rated themselves as more similar to the ingroup, but 
only after they were reminded of their ingroup as being the recipient of special 
treatment from the outside world, either positive or negative. The researchers argue 
that in the intergroup context of sexual orientation, straight men’s collective self is 
especially salient and attractive and they in turn tend to see themselves as more 
similar to the ingroup. In the current study, the free response findings that straight 
men were more likely than gay men to mention the outgroup, reveals that straight 
men tended to use intergroup processing. This, of course, is counter to my original 
predictions, but in retrospect, the use of the language “straight man” (as opposed to 
“man”) may have been particularly likely to invite intergroup comparison. However, 
identification moderated the effects on perceived prototypicality. Consistent with 
predictions and previous research findings (Spears et al., 1997; Verkyuten & Nekuee, 
2002), low identifiers rated themselves as less prototypical than high identifiers for 
both gay and straight men. The moderating effect of identification on perceived 
prototypicality mattered more for gay men than straight men.  
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Contrary to my predictions and previous research (Simon et al, 1991) 
perceived homogeneity did not differ among gay and straight men. The lack of effects 
can be explained by the assumption that for both gay and straight men the 
comparative context was intergroup. Following the above discussion that using 
“straight man” as opposed to “man” may have been likely to introduce an intergroup 
context for straight participants, and following the theoretical conceptualization of 
gay men engaging in intergroup comparison, there would not be differences in 
perceived homogeneity.  
Furthermore, the gay participants were recruited predominantly through My 
Space, while the straight men were undergraduate students. Gay men who identify as 
gay in public websites may experience their sexual orientation differently than gay 
men who do not “publicize” their sexual orientation. Therefore, the gay men in my 
sample could be different from other gay men, in terms of identification and 
perceptions of their ingroup status in society. Similarly, using only undergraduate 
students as the “comparable” straight men group might be methodologically 
problematic.   
Study 3 
 The purpose of Study 3 was to extend the findings from Studies 1 and 2 by 
directly manipulating the comparative context. Studies 1 and 2 investigated “default” 
processing within the framework of gender and sexual orientation. Thus, comparative 
context was not manipulated; instead, “default” comparative processes for low and 
high status group members were assessed by examining spontaneous mentions of the 
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ingroup and outgroup. Self-stereotyping effects were also assessed only when 
“default” processes were occurring.  
In Study 3 an additional measure of comparative processes as well as the 
comparative context was introduced. If high status group members generally engage 
in intragroup processing when their category is made salient, then an explicit 
manipulation of intragroup processing should produce outcomes identical to the 
“default.” Similarly, if low status group members engage in intergroup processing 
when their category is salient, then an explicit manipulation of intergroup processing 
should produce outcomes identical to the “default.” But for high status groups, an 
intergroup manipulation should activate the outgroup and produce self-stereotyping 
effects and for low status groups, an intragroup manipulation will not active the 
outgroup and self-stereotyping effects will not be observed. Thus, in Study 3, I 
explicitly instructed participants to make intragroup or intergroup comparisons (or 
gave no instructions), so that the effect of comparative context could be observed. 
This study is related to Guimond et al.’s (2006) research involving manipulations of 
comparative context, but it attempts to investigate the difference in intragroup and 
intergroup processing across comparative contexts in addition to measuring self-
stereotyping in terms of trait-ratings.  
 This study also used an additional reaction-time based measure tapping into 
activation of the outgroup. I adopted a paradigm created to measure whether the self 
(Müssweiler & Strack, 1999) or the ingroup (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Banse, 
2005) is used as a standard of comparison, where the activation level of the 
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corresponding outgroup can be measured when the ingroup is made salient. In the 
original paradigm, participants were asked to rate the outgroup on several non-
stereotypic traits and immediately afterwards they completed a lexical decision task 
designed to access the level of activation of the corresponding ingroup by responding 
to words associated with that ingroup category (or to words not associated with the 
category and non-words). Faster reaction times to ingroup-related words following 
outgroup salience indicated that activation of the corresponding ingroup was high. 
While the original paradigm involved first making a particular outgroup salient by 
asking students to rate the group on characteristics associated with it, I adapted it for 
my study by first activating the ingroup, and then measuring the activation level of 
the corresponding outgroup. The trait terms that I chose were stereotypical masculine 
and feminine traits; thus the activation of the outgroup is captured via reaction times 
to stereotypical ingroup and outgroup traits. Following ingroup salience, one can 
determine if the outgroup was also activated if reaction times for outgroup-related 
words are similar to or faster than those for ingroup-related words.   
Male and female participants completed the lexical decision task (following 
ingroup activation), the measure of gender identification, the free-response to the 
question of what it means to be a member of their gender group, perceptions of 
prototypicality, and self-ratings on stereotypical and counter-stereotypical traits. 
Two general predictions were made for Study 3. First, for women in the 
“default” and intergroup comparison conditions, the category “men” will be activated 
to a greater extent than in the intragroup comparison condition. This will be reflected 
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in reaction times similar to ingroup-related words or faster reaction times to outgroup-
related words for the “default” and intergroup comparison condition.  For men in the 
“default” and the intergroup comparison conditions, the category “women” will be 
less likely to be activated than in the intergroup comparison. This will be reflected in 
slower reaction times to outgroup-related words in the “default” and intragroup 
comparison. Second, a similar effect will be seen for self-stereotyping, where men in 
the intragroup comparison and “default” condition will self-stereotype less than men 
in the intergroup condition; women in the intragroup condition will self-stereotype 
less than women in intergroup and “default” conditions. 
Method 
 Participants and Procedure. Participants were 228 undergraduates (115 
males and 113 females) at the University of Kansas who were enrolled in 
introductory psychology courses. The ethnic make-up was predominantly White 
(86.4%). Participants were run in groups of one to four per session. All groups 
consisted of same-sex participants and the experimenter was the same sex as the 
participants. The study was conducted via computers programmed using Authorware 
7.0 software.  
Dependent Measures. To activate their gender category in a non-stereotypic 
way, participants were first asked to rate their gender ingroup on four non-stereotypic 
dimensions (efficient, outgoing, studious and sociable) on a scale of 1 not at all / 7 
definitely. Before actually making these ratings, the comparative context 
manipulation was introduced. All participants were asked to provide the ratings of 
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their ingroup, however they were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 
intergroup comparison, asking participants to “focus on the differences between men 
and women, as you do these ratings”; intergroup comparison, asking participants to 
“focus on the differences among women/men, as you do these ratings”; or the 
“default” condition in which no comparison context was given.  
Immediately after participants rated their ingroup on the four non-stereotypic 
traits, they completed a lexical decision task in which the word targets included eight 
stereotypic male characteristics (e.g. competitive, insensitive) and eight stereotypic 
female characteristics (e.g. nurturing, emotional). For both sets of characteristics, four 
of the traits were positive and four were negative in valence. Sixteen non-words 
derived from the traits were included as well (e.g. competetile, emotionuk). The full 
list is in Appendix C. The thirty-two words and non-words were displayed in a 
different random order for each participant. Participants saw a mask (XXXXX) in the 
center of the screen for 225 ms, followed by a word or non-word that remained on the 
screen until a response was made. Participants were asked to press “5” on the number 
pad if the display was a meaningful English word, and “A” if the display was a 
meaningless non-word, as quickly and accurately as they could. Their reaction times 
(RTs) were recorded in milliseconds.   
 Participants next completed items measuring in-group identification, using 
the same group-level self-investment subscale as in Study 1 (α = .75) as well as the 
group-level definitions subscales: individual self-stereotyping (α = .89) and in-group 
homogeneity (α = .77) as in Study 2 (Leach et al, 2008).  Participants then rated 
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themselves on the same nineteen traits as in Study 1; nine stereotypical masculine 
traits (e.g. confident, insensitive) and ten stereotypical feminine traits (e.g. weak, 
compassionate), each rated on a scale ranging from 1 (never or almost never true) to 
7 (always or almost always true). The three factors generated were, warmth (α =. 81), 
strength (α= .71), and competitiveness (α = .70).  
Participants were then asked to generate free responses to what it means to be 
a member of their gender group, following the instructions used in Study 1. A 
demographics questionnaire followed.  
Results 
 The key predictions of Study 3 were that 1) in LDT reaction times, the 
outgroup gender category would show more evidence of activation for women than 
for men in the intergroup and the “default” condition (faster RTs), and 2) women 
would self-stereotype more than men in the intergroup and “default” condition (both 
on trait ratings and perceptions of prototypicality). In order to test these predictions, a 
series of Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were computed, in which participant 
gender and comparative context were the between factors (and in some cases, a 
repeated factor was included).  
Reaction Times. I examined only the RTs for meaningful English words. All 
RTs were examined for extreme values. Following a method proposed by Ulrich and 
Miller (1994), I calculated the mean for each trait and each RT value that was more 
than two SDs below or above the mean was substituted with the respective value at 2 
SDs below or above the mean (this affected fewer than 5% of RTs). Consistent with 
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recommendations about treatment of RTs, all were log-transformed prior to analysis 
(Fazio, 1990)9. Four indexes were created: male positive traits (competitive, strong, 
rational, protective), male negative traits (aggressive, insensitive, arrogant, violent), 
female positive traits (warm, nurturing, compassionate, affectionate) and female 
negative traits (weak, emotional, moody, dependable).  
A mixed-model ANOVA with trait type (masculine and feminine) and valence 
(positive and negative) as within-subjects variables and gender and condition as 
between-subjects variables revealed a main effect of trait type, F(1,222) = 9.44, p = 
.002, which was qualified by two higher order interactions: Gender X Trait Type, 
F(1,222) = 3.60, p = .06 and Trait Type X Valence, F(1,222) = 38.93, p < .001, and 
two marginally significant three-way interactions: Valence X Gender X Condition, 
F(2,222) = 2.58, p = .08 and Trait Type X Valence X Condition, F(2,222) = 2.74, p = 
.07. The four-way interaction was not significant, F (2,222) = .73, p = .48 
Because the Trait Type X Valence and Trait Type X Valence X Condition 
interactions were theoretically uninteresting (as they did not include participants’ 
gender), I will focus below on the Gender X Trait Type and Valence X Gender X 
Condition interactions. The Gender X Trait Type interaction is depicted in Figure 6. 
T-tests revealed that women responded faster to masculine traits (M = .98, SD = .24) 
than to feminine traits (M = 1.05, SD = .30), t(112) = -3.81, p < .001, suggestive of 
greater outgroup activation. Men did not respond differentially to masculine (M = 
1.02, SD = .25) and feminine traits (M = 1.04, SD = .25), t(114) = -.89, p = .37. The 
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sex difference was not significant for masculine, t(226) = .79, p = .43 or feminine 
traits, t(226) = -.49, p = .62.   
The Valence X Gender X Condition interaction is depicted in Figure 7, with 
separate Valence X Condition interactions depicted for men (top panel) and women 
(lower panel). T-tests revealed that men responded more quickly to negative words in 
the intergroup condition than in the intragroup condition (M = 1.09, SD = .28), t(71) = 
-1.93, p = .06. Women showed the opposite pattern, responding faster to negative 
words in the intragroup condition (M = 1.01, SD = .23) than in the intergroup 
condition, (M = 1.06, SD = .27), t(75) = 1.79, p = .08. The difference in RTs for men 
and women in the intragroup condition on negative traits was also significant, t(73) = 
2.43, p = .02, with men responding more slowly than women. These were the only 
comparisons that were significant, ts < -1.57, ps > .12.  Since the content of the traits 
(masculine and feminine) did not interact with gender and condition, my predictions 
were not supported. Interestingly, women appeared to be slower overall in the 
intergroup condition compared to the others, and men were slower overall in the 
intragroup condition compared to the others, although not statistically significant: 
women, ps < .18; men ps < .15. Still, that this pattern appeared with regard to RTs to 
negative traits is inconsistent with the idea that intergroup processing is the default 
for women and intragroup processing is the default for men. 
Free responses. The free responses were coded by two independent raters 
blind to the hypotheses of the study. As in the previous two studies, the coding 
included whether participants mentioned their own gender (κ = .90), the opposite 
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gender (κ = .94), and same gender stereotypes (κ = .52). A third rater reconciled any 
differences.  
 A mixed-model ANOVA with mentions of same and opposite gender as the 
within-subjects variables and gender and condition as between-subjects variables, 
revealed a main effect of participant gender, F(1, 222) = 7.65, p < .01, a main effect 
of the gender group mentioned, F(1,222) = 9.08, p < .001, and a significant Gender X 
Group Mentioned interaction, F(1, 222) = 6.03, p < .05. As predicted, women 
mentioned the opposite gender (M = .41, SD = .49) more often than men did (M = .24, 
SD = .43), t(226) = -2.67, p = .008 (see Figure 8). Also as in Study 1, women (M = 
.75, SD = .43) tended to mention their own gender more often than men (M = .64, SD 
= .48), t(226) = -1.75, p = .08. Comparative condition produced no effects, Fs < 1, ps 
> .46.  
A gender X condition ANOVA on spontaneous mention of same-gender 
stereotypes also produced a main effect of gender, F (1, 222) = 9.57, p < .001. Men 
(M = .71, SD = 45) mentioned ingroup stereotypic characteristics more often than 
women did (M = .50, SD = 49), t(226) = 3.43, p = .001. However, there were no 
effects of comparison condition, Fs < 1.85, ps > .16.10  
Overall, the free response findings replicate Study 1, but are inconsistent with 
the more focused predictions of Study 3 that implicated effects of comparative 
context. Instead, women tended to mention their own and the opposite gender more, 
suggesting that regardless of comparative processes for women the outgroup category 
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“men” was more easily activated than for men. Men, however, tended to mention 
more ingroup stereotypic characteristics than women. 
 Prototypicality and homogeneity: Gender X Condition ANOVAs on the 
prototypicality and homogeneity measures revealed no main or interaction effects on 
prototypicality (Fs < 2.29, p > .10), and only a main effect of gender on homogeneity, 
F(1, 227) = 4.56,  p = .03. Surprisingly, men reported perceiving their group as more 
homogenous (M = 4.90, SD = 1.03) than women (M = 4.58, SD = 1.14). These 
judgments were not affected by the comparison condition, Fs < 1.00, ps > .52. These 
findings are inconsistent with predictions that women would perceive themselves as 
more prototypical and see their gender group as more homogenous, particularly in the 
intergroup and “default” conditions. Heightened homogeneity was predicted for men 
only in the intergroup comparison condition.  
 Traits. A mixed-model ANOVA with the three trait factors as the within-
subject variable and gender and condition as the between-subjects variables, revealed 
a significant Gender X Trait Type interaction, F(2, 221) = 35.58, p < .001. Consistent 
with Study 1, independent t-tests revealed a significant gender effect on warmth, 
t(226) = -5.49, p < .00,1 and competitiveness, t(226) = 5.06, p < .001, but not on 
strength, t(226) = 1.55, p = .12. Women rated themselves higher on warmth (M = 
5.88, SD = .73) than men (M = 5.33, SD = .81). Men rated themselves higher on 
competitiveness (M = 5.68, SD = 1.20) than women (M = 4.81, SD = 1.38). Paired-
samples t-tests revealed that the difference of warmth and competitiveness was 
significant both for women, t(112) = 7.52, p < .001, and for men, t(114) = -2.61, p = 
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.01 (see Figure 9).  There were no effects of condition, Fs < 1.17, ps > .32. This 
finding is inconsistent with the comparative context predictions: Regardless of the 
comparative context, men and women rated themselves higher on stereotypic 
characteristics and lower on counter-stereotypic characteristics.  
Identification. A 2 (gender) X 2 (condition) ANOVA on identification 
revealed only a main effect of gender, F(1,222) = 10.78, p < .001. Women (M = 5.43, 
SD = .66) identified more strongly with their gender group than men did (M = 5.12, 
SD = .77). This pattern is inconsistent with Study 1, in which there was no gender 
difference in levels of identification with one’s gender group. To investigate the 
moderating effect of identification on all DVs, nine separate multiple regression 
analyses were run with identification, gender, condition (dummy coded) and their 
interactions as predictors. Identification played a moderating role in three cases 
(category activation/RTs, prototypicality and homogeneity). Because the results were 
not theoretically relevant or explainable, they are not presented here.  
Discussion 
 One of the main purposes of Study 3 was to further investigate the “default” 
comparative processes by manipulating the comparative context. The implicit RT 
measure designed to tap into outgroup activation after activating the ingroup category 
did not produce any of the predicted comparative context effects. But it was the case 
that women—regardless of comparative context (intergroup, intragroup, and 
“default”)—showed quicker responses to outgroup traits, which speaks to my 
prediction that intergroup processing is more dominant for women. The outgroup 
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category “men” was activated for women, but the outgroup category “women” 
showed no particular evidence of activation for men. However, once again, the 
comparative context did not moderate this effect.  
Comparative context did matter in a different way – it interacted with gender 
and trait valence (positive and negative). Men responded faster to negative words in 
the intergroup comparison than in the intragroup and women showed the opposite 
pattern, responding faster to negative words in intragroup than intergroup comparison 
condition. Although I did not have any predictions regarding trait valence, it is 
problematic from my perspective that slowing (though only to negative traits) 
occurred in those conditions I consider “defaults” (intragroup for men, intergroup for 
women). Research has shown that on reaction time measures of this sort, both men 
and women tend to be faster for positive traits in comparison with negative traits 
(Estes & Verges, in press; Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000). However, this 
pattern was not replicated here, and the finding cannot be explained within existing 
research. 
 The free response measure produced similar results to the reaction time 
measure with regard to the activation of the outgroup for women: Women in 
comparison to men were more likely to mention their own as well as the opposite 
gender more often, when describing what it means for them to be a member of their 
gender group.  In regard to the usage of ingroup stereotypic traits, men used more 
male stereotypes (e.g. leader, provider, strong, etc.) to describe the meaning of being 
a male, than women used female stereotypes. These findings replicate those of Study 
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1, but the lack of evidence for comparative context effects is inconsistent with the 
more focused predictions of this study. 
 In terms of self-stereotyping, there were no perceived differences in 
prototypicality between men and women, nor were there differences across conditions 
within men and women. The ingroup homogeneity effect was unexpected, with men 
perceiving their gender group as more homogenous than women did. The trait ratings 
replicated the findings of Study 1, where women rated themselves as warmer and less 
competitive than men and men rated themselves as more competitive and less warm 
than women. However, no comparative context effects were found for any of these 
measures.  
Counter to Study 1, there was a significant gender difference in level of 
identification with one’s gender group, with women showing higher identification 
than men. One potential explanation for the difference in results across studies lies in 
the differential timing of the measure. In Study 1, gender identification was the first 
measure that participants completed, but in Study 3, it followed the reaction time 
measure and perhaps the salience of gender overall. Whatever the explanation, the 
current finding is consistent with empirical findings showing that in real life groups, 
low status can be associated with enhanced identification (Branscombe, Schmitt & 
Harvey, 1999; Doosje et al., 1999; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999). Still, there was 
no evidence that identification moderated the effects of gender on self-stereotyping in 
the manner predicted. 
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One reason for the lack of comparative context effects may be that the 
manipulation was only introduced early in the study, but was not restated later for the 
other dependent variables. Given the large number of judgments participants 
provided, it is perhaps not surprising that the context effect was weak. In Study 4, I 
attempted to render the manipulation more salient throughout the whole study.  
Study 4 
 Study 4 was designed as a replication of Study 3, but with a more salient 
manipulation of comparative context and an additional measure of processing mode 
(intra versus intergroup). As in Study 3, the comparative context (intergroup, 
intragroup, and “default”) was manipulated, but participants were reminded of the 
context in later judgments. In addition to the standard explicit measures of self-
stereotyping (e.g. prototypicality and trait ratings), I incorporated an implicit measure 
of intra- versus intergroup processing. I used the method developed by Lorenzi-Cioldi 
(1991), in which participants pressed keys labeled “me” or “not me” in response to 
computer-presented traits. Lorenzi-Cioldi (1991) argued that faster acceptance of 
ingroup traits and faster rejection of outgroup traits (in comparison with rejection of 
ingroup and acceptance of outgroup traits) is indicative of intergroup processing (both 
ingroup and outgroup are activated); faster response to ingroup traits (acceptance and 
rejection) in comparison with response to outgroup traits is indicative of intragroup 
processing (only ingroup activated).  
Participants were first asked to perform the “me”/ “not me” task. They then 
completed a questionnaire assessing (in order): 1) their level of identification with 
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their gender group 2) self-ratings on gendered traits 3) perceptions of prototypicality 
and homogeneity, and 4) what it means to be a member of their gender group. 
Two general predictions were made for Study 4. First, women in the 
intergroup comparison and “default” condition will show the most evidence of 
intergroup processing, responding faster to acceptance of ingroup attributes and 
rejection of outgroup attributes in comparison with rejection of ingroup and 
acceptance of outgroup traits. Men in the intergroup condition should also show 
evidence of this pattern. In contrast, women in the intragroup comparison condition 
will show evidence of intragroup processing, responding faster to ingroup traits 
(acceptance and rejection) in comparison with outgroup traits, as should  men in the 
intragroup and “default” conditions. Second, on the standard measures of self-
stereotyping (prototypicality and trait ratings), men in the intragroup and “default” 
conditions will self-stereotype less than men in the intergroup condition; women in 
the intragroup condition will self-stereotype less than women in the intergroup and 
“default” conditions.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure. Participants were 159 undergraduates (71 males 
and 88 females) at the University of Kansas who were enrolled in introductory 
psychology courses. The ethnic make-up was predominantly White (83.6%). 
Participants participated in groups of one to four per session. All groups consisted of 
same-sex participants and the experimenter was the same sex as the participants. The 
study took place on a computer and was programmed using Authorware 7.0 software.  
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Participants first completed the implicit self-stereotyping measure. They were 
told that they would see a mask (XXXXX; presented for 225 ms) followed by a word. 
The instructions were as follows: “Your task is to press “i” if the attribute word 
applies to you (it is descriptive of yourself) and to press “e” if the attribute word does 
not apply to you (it is not descriptive of yourself).” The association of “i” and “e” 
keys with traits descriptive of the “me” or “not me” was counterbalanced. The 
comparative context manipulation was introduced prior to completion of this task and 
remained on the screen throughout the task.  In the intergroup comparison condition, 
participants were instructed to “focus on the application of the attribute to you in 
comparison with women/men” [the outgroup], in the intragroup comparison 
condition, they were asked to “focus on the application of the attribute to you in 
comparison with other men/women” [the ingroup], and in the “default” condition, no 
comparison context was given. Participants were presented with 21 stereotypic 
masculine characteristics (e.g. insensitive, strong) and 22 stereotypic feminine 
characteristics (e.g. caring, emotional). These included both positive (e.g. warm, 
rational) and negative (e.g. dependent, aggressive) female and male stereotypic traits. 
The traits were from Kite (2001). The words were presented in a different random 
order for each participant. The full list is provided in Appendix D.  
Dependent Measures.  Reaction times (RTs) assessing the speed (in 
milliseconds) with which participants responded “me” or “not me” to stereotypical 
male and female traits as descriptive or non-descriptive of themselves were recorded. 
These were then used to compute intragroup and intergroup processing indexes, as 
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described below. The comparative context manipulation was repeated with 
subsequent measures.  
Participants next completed items measuring in-group identification, using the 
same group-level self-investment subscale as in Study 1 (α = .80) as well as the 
group-level definitions subscales: individual self-stereotyping (α = .91) and in-group 
homogeneity (α = .76) as in Studies 2 and 3, from Leach et al. (2008).  
Participants then rated themselves on the same nineteen traits as in Study 1; 
nine stereotypical male traits (e.g. confident, insensitive) and ten stereotypical female 
traits (e.g. weak, compassionate). Following the three factors that were revealed when 
factor analyses were ran for Studies 1 and 3, the same three factors were computed 
for the current study: warmth (α = .78), strength (α = .63), and competitiveness (α = 
.66).  
Participants next were asked to generate free responses to what it means to be 
a member of their gender group, following the instructions used in Study 1. The 
comparison condition was NOT reiterated in the instructions for this task.  Next, 
participants’ perceptions of the social status of women were assessed by answering 
the question “Do you think that women have lower social status than men?”11 (yes = 
1/no = 0) as well as their political ideology on a scale ranging from 1 (very 






The key predictions of Study 4 were that 1) in “me” / “not me” reaction times, 
women would show evidence of intergroup processing in both the intergroup and 
“default” conditions (faster RTs to acceptance of ingroup attributes and rejection of 
outgroup attributes in comparison with rejection of ingroup and acceptance of 
outgroup traits), and men would show evidence of intragroup processing in both the 
intragroup and “default” conditions (faster RTs to ingroup traits (acceptance and 
rejection) in response to outgroup traits), and 2) women would self-stereotype more 
than men in the intergroup and “default” condition (both on trait  ratings and 
perceptions of prototypicality). In order to test these predictions, a series of Analyses 
of Variance (ANOVAs) were computed, in which participants’ gender and 
comparative context were the between factors (and in some cases, a repeated factor 
was included).  
Implicit Measure of Intragroup and Intergroup processing  
Trait endorsement. Before turning to the key prediction regarding evidence 
for intragroup and intergroup processing, I first analyzed “me” endorsements of traits. 
A mixed-model ANOVA with the mean proportion of masculine and feminine 
stereotypic traits endorsed as self-descriptive as the within-subjects variable, and 
gender and comparative context as between-subjects variables, revealed a main effect 
of trait type, F(1, 153) = 2877.53, p < .001 and gender , F(1, 153) = 15.28, p < .001 
which was qualified by a significant  Trait Type X Gender interaction, F(2, 153) = 
15.28, p < .001. Paired-samples t-tests indicated that the effect of trait type was 
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significant for both men, t(70) = 37.13, p < .001 and women, t(87) = 39.74, p < .001, 
and within each trait type, a reliable sex difference was observed (for masculine traits, 
t (157) = 3.78, p < .001; for feminine traits, t (157) = 3.78, p < .001). As can be seen 
in Table 3, men endorsed more masculine traits than feminine traits as applicable to 
the self. However, the same pattern was observed for women, who also endorsed 
more masculine than feminine traits. Comparative context produced no effects, Fs < 
1.50, ps > .23.  
RT-based measures of intra- and intergroup processing. All RTs were 
examined for extreme values. Following a method proposed by Ulrich and Miller 
(1994), I calculated the mean for each trait, and each RT value that was more than 
two SDs below or above the mean was substituted with the respective value at 2 SDs 
below or above the mean (this affected fewer than 4% of RTs). Consistent with 
recommendations about treatment of RTs, all were log-transformed prior to analysis 
(Fazio, 1990)12. I calculated the mean RTs for consistent and inconsistent information 
for male and female traits. What constitutes consistent and inconsistent information 
for men and women for intragroup and intergroup processing is shown in Table 4. 
In order to examine the effects on intergroup processing, a mixed-model 
ANOVA with Intergroup Trait Set (masculine “me”/ feminine “not me” vs. feminine 
“me” / masculine “not me”) as the within-subjects variable and gender and condition 
as the between-subjects variables was computed. The analysis revealed a Trait Set X 
Gender interaction, F(1, 153) = 6.17, p = .02. T-tests revealed a sex difference in RTs 
to both the masculine “me”/ feminine “not me”, t(157) = 2.72, p < .001 and feminine 
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“me” / masculine “not me” judgments, t(157) = 5.49, p < .001, with women 
responding faster than men to both sets of traits (see Figure 10). Furthermore, the 
difference between RTs to masculine “me”/ feminine “not me” and feminine “me”/ 
masculine “not me” was significant only for men, t(70) = -2.09, p = .04 but not for 
women, t(87) = 1.41, p = .16. Men were faster to respond to consistent information 
than inconsistent information, evidence of intergroup processing. There were no 
effects of comparative context effects, Fs < 2.12, ps > .12. These findings are 
inconsistent with my predictions. It was women who were hypothesized to engage in 
intergroup processing in the intergroup and “default” condition. Instead, regardless of 
comparative context, men showed stronger evidence of intergroup processing.  
To examine the effects on intragroup processing, I ran a comparable mixed-
model ANOVA with Intragroup Trait Set (masculine “me”/ masculine “not me” vs. 
feminine “me” / feminine “not me”) as the within-subjects variable and gender and 
condition as the between-subjects variables. The analysis revealed a Trait Set X 
Gender interaction, F(1, 153) = 5.06, p = .03. Again, women responded more quickly 
than men to both the masculine “me”/ masculine “not me”, t(157) = 3.33, p < .001, 
and feminine “me” / feminine “not me” traits, t(157) = 4.55, p < .001 (see Figure 11). 
In this case, the difference between the two trait sets was significant only for women, 
t(87) = 2.37, p = .02 but not for men, t(70) = -.81, p =.42. Women were faster to 
respond to consistent information than inconsistent information for intragroup 
processing. Comparative context effects were not significant, Fs < 1.26, ps > .25. 
These findings are again contrary to my predictions that men would engage in the 
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intragroup processing in the intragroup and “default” condition. Instead, regardless of 
comparative context, women show the strongest evidence of intragroup processing13.  
Free responses. The free responses were coded in the manner described in 
Studies 1 and 3, by two independent raters blind to the hypotheses of the study. The 
coding included whether participants mentioned their own gender (κ = .82), the 
opposite gender (κ = .86), and same gender stereotypes (κ = .62). Reliability was 
again low for this latter construct; a third rater reconciled any differences. Mentioning 
same-, opposite-, and same-gender stereotypes was coded as 1, and the lack of 
mention was coded as 0. A mixed-model ANOVA with mentions of same and 
opposite gender as the within-subject variable and gender and condition as between-
subjects variables revealed only a main effect of the gender mentioned, F(1, 153) = 
2.22, p < .001. Participants tended to mention their own gender more often (M = .92, 
SD = .27) than the opposite gender (M = .30, SD = .56). Comparative context and 
participant gender produced no effects, Fs < 1, ps > .55. Although these findings are 
inconsistent with the results of Studies 1 and 3, and with the additional prediction of 
moderation based on comparative context, the means for of mention same- and 
opposite-gender were in the right direction, with women mentioning their own (M = 
.94) and the opposite gender (M = .34) more often then men did (Ms = .89 and .23). A 
gender X condition ANOVA on spontaneous mention of ingroup gender stereotypes 
revealed no effect of gender or comparative context, Fs < 1.45, ps > .2314.  
Prototypicality and homogeneity. Participant Gender X Comparative Context 
ANOVAs for prototypicality and homogeneity revealed no significant effects; 
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prototypicality, Fs < 1.40, ps >. 24 and homogeneity, Fs < 1, ps > .36. The lack of 
effects on prototypicality and homogeneity are inconsistent with my predictions. 
However, the means on prototypicality in the “default” condition were in the 
predicted direction: Women (M = 5.02, SD = 1.41) rated themselves more 
prototypical than men (M = 4.72, SD = 1.18). 
Traits. A mixed-model ANOVA with the three trait factors (warmth, strength, 
competitiveness) as a within-subject variable and gender and comparative context as 
between-subjects variables revealed a main effect of traits, F(2,152) = 12.77, p < 
.001, which was further qualified by a significant Trait X Gender interaction, F(2, 
152) = 24.33, p < .001. Consistent with Studies 1 and 3, independent t-tests revealed a 
significant gender effect for warmth, t(157) = -5.70, p < .001 and competitiveness, 
t(157) = 3.30, p < .001, but not for strength, t(157) = -.51, p = .61. As can be seen in 
Figure 12, women rated themselves higher on warmth (M = 5.93, SD = .68) than men 
(M = 5.19, SD = .95), whereas men rated themselves higher on competitiveness (M = 
5.39, SD = 1.38) than women (M = 4.64, SD = 1.47). Paired-samples t-tests revealed 
that the difference between warmth and competitiveness was significant for women, 
t(87) = 7.77, p < .001, but not for men, t(70) = -.99, p = .33. That is, women judged 
themselves significantly more warm than competitive; whereas men judged 
themselves relatively equally on these two dimensions. Although men and women did 
rate themselves higher on gender stereotypic dimensions, these patterns were not 
moderated, as predicted, by comparison condition, Fs < 2.00, ps > .13.  
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Identification. A 2 (gender) X 2 (comparative context) ANOVA on 
identification revealed a significant main effect of gender, F(1,153) = 25.96, p < .001, 
which was qualified by  Gender X Comparative context interaction, F(1,153) = 3.46, 
p = .034. The means appear in Table 5. Women were generally higher in 
identification than men across all conditions, but significantly so in the “default”, F(1, 
153) = 11.26, p < .001, and intragroup conditions, F(1, 153) = 5.97, p = .02. 
Women’s identification levels were unaffected by the condition manipulation, Fs < 1, 
ps > .55, but men’s were. Men’s identification with their gender group increased in 
the intergroup condition compared to the “default” condition, F(1, 153) = 7.91, p < 
.01. This pattern is inconsistent with the findings from Study 1, in which no gender 
difference in identification was observed. In Study 3, women identified more strongly 
with their gender group than men, an effect that continued to be observed in the 
“default” and intragroup conditions of this study. Study 4 documents, however, that 
in an intergroup context, men’s level of identification is comparable to that of 
women. Because identification was affected by the context manipulation, I did not 
examine the role of identification as a potential moderating factor in predicting the 
other dependent variables. 
Discussion 
In Study 4, only the trait ratings replicated self-stereotyping findings from 
Studies 1 and 3: Women rated themselves as warmer and less competitive than men. 
But as in Study 3, trait ratings were not influenced by comparative context. Free 
responses – which showed clear evidence of women mentioning the in- and outgroup 
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more often than men in Studies 1 and 3—were not replicated in Study 4. Men and 
women mentioned the same and the opposite gender similarly, and men did not use 
more ingroup stereotypic characteristics to describe what it means to be a man. 
Perceived prototypicality did not differ across comparative context and gender.  
The only variable that was affected by context in a straightforward way was 
ingroup identification. Women were higher in identification than men in the “default” 
and intragroup conditions, and women’s identification did not vary by condition. But 
men’s identification did vary, with heightened identification in the intergroup 
comparison condition. Although my predictions about context were not relevant to 
levels of identification, this finding is consistent with the idea that the intergroup 
comparison condition moved men to a different level of identity than the intragroup 
and “default” conditions. For women, although not statistically significant, the means 
were also in the desired direction, with higher identification in the intergroup and 
“default” conditions in comparison with the intragroup.  
  Results on the implicit measure (Lorentzi-Cioldi, 1991) did not vary as 
predicted as a result of the comparative context. With regard to endorsed proportion 
of traits, both men and women tended to choose more masculine traits as being 
applicable to themselves (“me”) than feminine traits. One explanation for this pattern 
is that the nature of gender stereotypes is changing, with more masculine traits being 
perceived by women as applicable to them (Auster & Ohm, 2000; Twenge, 1997). 
For example, Twenge’s (1997) meta-analysis of studies using Bem Sex Role 
Inventory (Bem, 1974) found that women’s endorsement of masculine-stereotyped 
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traits has increased over time, while men have not varied much in their non-
endorsement of feminine-stereotyped traits.   
With regard to the speed with which participants responded “me” or “not me,” 
gender differences emerged in the opposite direction of my predictions. It was men, 
not women, who showed evidence of intergroup processing, responding faster to 
gender consistent information (masculine “me” / feminine “not me”) in comparison 
with inconsistent information. And it was women, not men, who showed evidence of 
intragroup processing, responding faster to consistent information (feminine “me” / 
feminine “not me”) in comparison with inconsistent information. However, women 
responded faster than men overall on both the intragroup and intergroup processing 
indexes. Although this does not speak directly to the predicted effects, it is suggestive 
of both ingroup and outgroup activation for women compared to men. However, the 
processing indexes were not affected by the comparative context manipulation. 
Despite making the relevant comparison more salient throughout most of the 
procedure, I was not successful in altering the type of processing in which men and 
women engaged.  
General Discussion 
 The main goal of the present research was to investigate the moderating effect 
of group status on self-stereotyping. Specifically, I proposed that in naturally 
occurring groups positioned differentially in the social hierarchy: 1) under “default” 
conditions, high status group members engage in intragroup processing and low status 
group members engage in intergroup processing and 2) under “default” conditions, 
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high status group members self-stereotype less than low status group members. Four 
empirical studies examined “default” processing and self-stereotyping in the context 
of gender and sexual orientation (Studies 1 and 2) and by directly manipulating the 
comparative context (Studies 3 and 4). The moderating role of group identification 
was also addressed.  
Different measures and conceptualizations of self-stereotyping were used 
within each study: perceived prototypicality and homogeneity, self-ratings on ingroup 
and outgroup stereotypic characteristics. Free responses to the meaning of a particular 
salient identity were also used to capture spontaneous mentions of stereotyped 
characteristics, but also to examine evidence of outgroup activation when one thinks 
of the ingroup. The results across the four studies and different measures were mixed. 
Below, I will first discuss each measure in turn, and then focus on the (mostly null) 
effects of my comparative context manipulation.  
Free responses 
 The free response measure was designed to assess spontaneous mention of the 
outgroup when one considers the ingroup. In Studies 1 and 3, I found that women 
tended to mention both their own and the opposite gender more often than men did. 
These findings are consistent with my predictions that when women think of 
themselves as women, the outgroup category “men” is more readily activated, 
perhaps because the “default” processing mode for those lower in social status is 
intergroup. However, this effect was not replicated in Study 4, and an opposite pattern 
appeared in Study 2, with straight men mentioning gay men more often than the 
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reverse. This finding might be due to the fact that the language use of “straight men,” 
not just “men,” rendered the gay outgroup particularly salient. 
An unexpected pattern of “self-stereotyping” was observed for men in the free 
responses, in that they were more likely to spontaneously mention stereotypes of their 
gender when asked to describe what it means to be a man (Studies 1 and 3). Similarly, 
in Study 2, straight men mentioned “straight” stereotypes more often than gay men 
mentioned “gay” stereotypes. One explanation may be that men, having higher status 
in society, are particularly likely to be invested in masculine self-conceptions. For 
men, acting in masculine ways (describing themselves in terms of masculine traits) 
could be seen as endorsing or highlighting their higher social status (Feinman, 1984).  
Although the above explanation can account for straight men’s endorsement 
of more masculine stereotypic traits as self-descriptive, a more suitable account (in 
terms of sexual orientation being salient) may lie in research on the “sexual 
orientation hypothesis” (McCreary, 1994). Research has found that the gender-
associated traits are more rigidly defined for men than for women (e.g. Hort, Fagot, & 
Leinbach, 1990), and men report more congruence in their gender roles than women 
do (Twenge, 1999). People react more negatively to men who possess more feminine 
characteristics than to women who possess more masculine characteristics (e.g. 
McCreary, 1994). Furthermore, McCreary (1994) has proposed that males acting in 
feminine ways are more likely to be perceived as gay than are women acting in 
masculine ways likely to be perceived as lesbian.  Thus, fear of being perceived as 
gay could lead men to use more masculine traits and gender-role characteristics to 
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describe the meaning of their gender and heterosexual orientation. This suggests an 
interesting possibility in that the “default” for high status groups may be intragroup 
processing but not necessarily low levels of self-stereotyping. I will elaborate on this 
more fully below. 
Self-ratings on stereotype-relevant traits 
 The measurement that produced consistent results across all studies was 
stereotypic trait endorsement. Men and women, as well as gay and straight men, rated 
themselves higher on ingroup stereotypic traits and lower on outgroup stereotypic 
traits. A point that needs to be addressed is that the trait factors that were generated 
constituted only positive traits (warmth, competitiveness, strength). Although 
negative traits were included in the self-rating list, they did not load well in the 
gender studies. For the sexual orientation study, two of the factors were negative 
(social weakness and complains) and only social weakness was endorsed as self-
descriptive by straight men. This is contrary to previous findings, where gay men 
endorsed both negative and positive stereotypical traits, and straight men endorsed 
only positive traits associated with their group (Simon et al, 1991).  
 According to SCT, endorsement of both positive and negative stereotypic 
traits is indicative of self-stereotyping (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). However, according 
to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the motivation for positive social identity will lead to 
positive stereotypes being more easily integrated into the self-concept, because it 
promotes higher collective self-esteem. Katz, Joiner and Kwon (2002) have shown 
that internalization of negative stereotypes can threaten one’s social identity and 
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result in lower group-level self-esteem. It could be that the endorsement of negative 
traits is less threatening to straight men than to gay men, whose collective self-esteem 
is already threatened by their low group status.  
Prototypicality 
The self-stereotyping measure of perceived prototypicality produced mixed 
results across the four studies. In Study 1, results were consistent with predictions in 
that women rated themselves as more prototypical gender group members than men. 
In Study 2, it was straight men who perceived themselves as more prototypical but 
this effect was moderated by group identification. It was at low levels of 
identification that this effect occurred. For both gay and straight men, higher 
identification was associated with more perceived prototypicality, but as predicted, 
this was especially the case for gay men. Previous research has argued that straight 
men’s collective self is especially attractive in intergroup contexts, and that they tend 
to see themselves as more similar to the “straight” ingroup when the group “gay men” 
is salient (Simon et al.,1995). Simon et al. (1995) also found that gay participants 
rated themselves as more similar to the ingroup, but only after they were reminded of 
their ingroup as being the recipient of special treatment from the outside world, either 
positive or negative. This was not the contextual case for Study 2. Instead, as noted 
earlier, the intergroup context may have been highlighted in straight men by using the 
term “straight man” rather than “man.”  
In Studies 3 and 4, there were no gender effects on perceived prototypicality. 
In both studies, prototypicality ratings were assessed after the reaction time measures 
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and the gender identification measure. It is possible that exposure to male and female 
traits in the RT task and assessment of gender identification made the intergroup 
context salient to all participants, leading to a lack of gender difference in perceived 
prototypicality.  
Homogeneity 
Perceived ingroup homogeneity was operationalized as a measure of self-
stereotyping by Simon et al. (1991). He found that gay men (low status group 
members) perceived their ingroup as more homogenous than straight men. Research 
has also shown that under conditions of depersonalization (i.e. an intergroup context) 
group members tend to perceive their ingroups as more homogenous (e.g. Brewer, 
1993; Haslam et al, 1995). Similarly, Lorenzi-Cioldi (1998) has argued that low 
status group members are homogenized to a larger extent than high status group 
members by both outgroup and ingroup members. This maps onto the current 
prediction that if low status group members tend to engage in intergroup processing, 
they should perceive their ingroup as more homogenous than do high status group 
members.  
In the current research, homogeneity was used in three of the four studies 
(Studies 2, 3 and 4). Only in Study 3 there was a significant main effect of social 
group, though in a direction opposite to predictions: Men unexpectedly perceived 
their group as more homogenous than women. Since the first measure in Studies 3 
and 4 exposed participants to both masculine and feminine words, an intergroup 
context may have been activated for both men and women. As noted earlier, research 
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has shown that in intergroup contexts, men’s collective self is especially attractive 
and they in turn tend to see themselves as more similar to the ingroup (Simon et al., 
1995). Although the naturally occurring groups used by Simon et al. (1995, Studies 3 
and 4) were straight and gay men, the effect should generalize to any group 
memberships that have positive implications for one’s self-image.  Perceived 
homogeneity may be another marker of this tendency. 
Implicit reaction time measures 
Two implicit reaction time measures were used to investigate the predicted 
pattern of intergroup processing for low status group members and intragroup 
processing for high status group members. In Study 3, following a paradigm created 
to measure whether the self (Müssweiler & Strack, 1999) or the ingroup (Gawronski, 
Bodenhausen & Banse, 2005) is used as a standard of comparison, I assessed whether 
outgroup characteristics were salient after activating the ingroup. The only effect 
involving participants’ gender was that women tended to respond faster to masculine 
traits than to feminine traits; for men there was no difference in response times. This 
pattern is consistent with my predictions, in that the outgroup category was more 
salient for women than for men. However, comparative context did not moderate this 
effect.  
In Study 4, I used Lorenzi-Cioldi’s (1991) paradigm of detecting intergroup 
and intragroup processing through comparison of reaction times in “me” / “not me” 
responses to consistent and inconsistent ingroup and outgroup characteristics. I 
predicted that women would show more evidence of intergroup processing and men 
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would show more evidence of intragroup processing. Instead, the reverse of this 
pattern was found. It was men who showed more evidence of intergroup processing 
and women of intragroup processing (regardless of comparative context). I would 
argue that it is too early to conclude that the opposite of my prediction reflects reality. 
First, Lorenzi-Cioldi (1991) used the same paradigm (with the exception of the 
“default” condition) and found intergroup processing for women (especially when 
their gender identity was salient) but not the hypothesized intragroup processing for 
men. Therefore, two different studies using the same paradigm produced very 
inconsistent results, suggesting that more research is needed. Second, my other 
measure of intergroup and intragroup processing (free response mentions of the 
outgroup) is consistent with the prediction that intergroup processing is more likely 
for women than for men. Lastly, in Studies 3 and 4, women tended to respond more 
quickly to masculine traits than men did (although not always at statistically 
significant levels), which seems to indicate activation of the outgroup for women. 
Still, the “me”/ “not me” data are puzzling; future research is needed to more fully 
understand this measure and what it can reveal about processing modes.  
Group identification 
Research has shown that group identification enhances self-stereotyping 
effects (Doosje et al., 1995; Spears et al., 1997; Verkyutee & Neukee, 2002). The 
common finding is that those who highly identify with their groups are more likely to 
self-stereotype (in terms of perceived prototypicality and ingroup homogeneity), and 
that the effect is particularly strong for members of low status groups. Across the four 
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studies here, group identification produced inconsistent results. In Studies 1 and 2, 
men and women, and gay and straight men did not differentially identify with their 
respective groups.  Regression analyses investigating the moderating role of 
identification rarely revealed few significant effects and those that emerged were 
inconsistent. In Study 1, identification marginally predicted prototypicality in the 
predicted direction for men, but women who identified strongly with their gender 
group tended to see themselves as less prototypical. I have no clear explanation for 
this pattern and can only assume it is an aberration in this sample. In Study 2, 
identification predicted increased levels of prototypicality for both gay and straight 
men, but it mattered more for gay men, with highly identified gay men rating 
themselves as more prototypical than less identified gay men. 
In Study 3, women identified more strongly with their gender group than men, 
but identification did not moderate the effects of gender on any self-stereotyping 
measures. In Study 4, although women identified more with their gender group than 
men, the comparative context manipulation also influenced identification. Women 
were higher in identification than men in the “default” and intragroup conditions, but 
men’s identification rose to the level of women’s in the intergroup comparison 
condition. Intergroup context for men activates their gender category, which leads to 
enhanced identification (Turner et al., 1987). Women, due to their low status in 
society will be more likely to have an overall high levels of identification regardless 
of the comparative context (Branscombe et al.,1999; Doosje et al., 1999; Spears et al., 
1999).  
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Previous research has shown that identification predicts prototypicality 
(Spears et al., 1997), but particularly when group status is under threat (Spears et al., 
1997; Verkuyten & Neukee, 1999). Since status threat was not manipulated in any of 
the current studies, I may have been lacking the full set of ingredients to prompt a 
consistent association between identification and this measure of self-stereotyping.   
Comparative context 
One failure in Studies 3 and 4 was the largely nonsignificant effects of the 
comparative context manipulation. There were no comparative context effects on any 
of the self-stereotyping measures: Implicit reaction times (with the exception of Study 
3’s LDT task; see Figure 7), trait ratings, and perceptions of prototypicality and 
homogeneity. In Study 4, comparative context only affected men’s identification with 
their gender group (intergroup comparison produced higher identification than the 
intragroup and “default” conditions).  
In both studies the comparative context was introduced with the first reaction 
time measure. Participants were told to make intragroup, intergroup or no particular 
comparison as they rated their group on stereotype-irrelevant traits. But the strength 
of the manipulation was compromised in that the instructions were not repeated on 
subsequent measures (for Study 4, the instructions were repeated on some measures, 
but not the free response). In future studies, the comparisons should be more strongly 
maintained throughout the procedure. Alternative methods of manipulating the 
comparative context could also be used. For example, participants might first interact 
with only women/men (the ingroup; an intragroup context), or with men and women 
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(intergroup context) before completing measures of processing mode and self-
stereotyping. 
Another problem with the manipulation of comparative context was that since 
all the measures were related to gender, and the first measure in Studies 3 and 4 
exposed participants to both masculine and feminine words, an intergroup context 
may have been activated regardless of the context manipulation. A future study 
should address this issue by including filler tasks between measures or in some other 
way ensure that an intergroup context is not rendered salient for everyone.  
Besides methodological problems, an explanation for the lack of comparative 
context effect, especially for women, is that if the mere activation of the category 
“woman” leads to the activation of the outgroup “man” (“default” condition), then 
even in an intragroup context the outgroup category will be activated as well. For 
example, Guimond et al. (2006) found that women’s ratings on relational and agentic 
traits did not differ (statistically) across the intergroup, intragroup, and control 
conditions. Similarly Lorenzi-Cioldi (1991) found that women engaged in intergroup 
processing (as assessed by an RT measure) in both intragroup and intergroup 
comparative contexts (although significantly only in the intergroup condition). In 
short, it may not be possible to “move around” women’s mode of processing, but 
perhaps men can more readily be shifted from an intragroup to an intergroup 





 This set of studies produced inconsistent and sometimes contradictory 
findings, and there are a number of features of the studies that could have contributed 
to this. One is the measurement of group identification (Leach et al., 2008). Some of 
the questions in the scale such as “I feel a bond with …,” I feel solidarity…,” and “I 
feel committed to…” were perceived (especially by male participants) as strange for a 
variety of reasons. Some comments included statements like “men don’t experience 
themselves like that” and questioning whether the purpose of the study is to “figure 
out whether I am gay or not.” This is problematic because if different meanings are 
imbued in a measure depending on one’s group membership, the answers across 
groups would not be comparable, which can lead to inconclusive results.  
Second, Study 2 might have suffered from low statistical power. My sample 
included only 16 gay men. A larger sample, perhaps recruited through means more 
comparable to that used to recruit straight men, would be appropriate. The gay 
participants were recruited predominantly through My Space. As mentioned 
previously, gay men who identify as gay in public websites may experience their 
sexual orientation differently than gay men who do not “publicize” their sexual 
orientation. Therefore, the gay men in my sample could be different from other gay 
men, in terms of identification and perceptions of their ingroup status in society.  
 Third, all of the participants in the research (with the exception of the 
majority of gay men) were undergraduate students at the University of Kansas. A 
potential issue with using college students to investigate the effects of gender status is 
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that they are less likely to believe that women are lower status because of the lack of 
experience confronting differential treatment. This statement is partially supported by 
the finding that although female participants in Study 4 were more likely than male 
participants to indicate that women have lower status than men in society, 39% of 
female participants indicated that women do NOT have lower status (see footnote 
11). In Study 2, only 13% of gay participants indicated that gay men did not have 
lower status than straight men. An older, non-college age sample might provide better 
insight into the role of status in self-stereotyping. 
Re-evaluating the hypotheses 
Group status and intragroup and intergroup processing 
 The current studies provide mixed support for the moderating effect of group 
status on intergroup and intragroup processing. Within the framework of gender, 
women (low status group) tended to mention the outgroup category more often than 
men did, which is evidence of outgroup activation for women (i.e. intergroup 
processing). However, within the framework of sexual orientation that was not the 
case: High status group (straight men) showed more outgroup activation.   
The implicit reaction time measures only partially supported the group status 
effect on intergroup and intragroup processing with women responding faster to 
masculine than to feminine traits in both Studies 3 and 4. However, using the more 
precise measure of processing mode (reaction times to gender- consistent and 
inconsistent information) men showed evidence of intergroup processing, and women 
of intragroup processing. 
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Based on these mixed findings, it appears that the first hypothesis of my 
dissertation, that group status leads to differential processing among members of low 
and high status groups, is either not valid or was not investigated properly. I am 
hesitant to reject the hypothesis as invalid, as some of the data were consistent with 
expectations. And I am unable to generate a theoretical explanation for the reverse 
pattern of findings in Study 4 (with men showing more evidence of intergroup and 
women of intragroup processing). The fact that my comparative context manipulation 
produced largely nonsignificant results is suggestive of some methodological 
problems, including the lack of sustained salience of the manipulation, and the use of 
too many dependent measures highlighting gender, which may have rendered an 
intergroup orientation for all participants. Thus, I can suggest that my data are 
inconclusive on this point. At the same time, I acknowledge that various motivational 
factors (e.g. positive group distinctiveness, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; group 
identification, Spears et al., 1997) could prove to be more powerful drives behind 
intergroup and intergroup processing than differential group status.  
Group status and self-stereotyping 
 The hypothesis that self-stereotyping is more likely for low status groups as a 
result of intergroup processing also received mixed support. On ingroup trait ratings, 
both high and low status groups endorsed ingroup stereotypical traits more than 
counter-stereotypical traits. However, it was consistently the low status group 
members who provided more divergent ratings, judging themselves higher on ingroup 
traits and lower on outgroup traits than the higher status group members. The free 
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response measure findings, however, indicated that high status group members self-
stereotyped more by using ingroup stereotypical characteristics to describe 
themselves.  
Similarly, perceptions of prototypicality and homogeneity varied, with straight 
men (high status) and women (low status) rating themselves as more prototypical. 
The effect for women however was limited to Study 1 and not replicated in Studies 3 
and 4. Homogeneity finding produced largely null results. Only in Study 3, men (high 
status) perceived themselves as more homogenous.  
There are countervailing forces making high and low status group members 
more or less likely to self-stereotype. Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) 
provides a cognitive account of self-stereotyping, with salience of one’s social 
identity promoting depersonalization and self-definition in terms of the shared 
characteristics of the salient social identity. On the other hand, social identity theory 
(Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) argues that people are motivated to 
perceive themselves favorably in relation to others, which is achieved in part by 
favorably comparing the ingroup with other relevant outgroups. Whether one uses an 
SCT or SIT framework leads to different predictions about the effect of group status 
on self-stereotyping. SCT predicts that individuals will self-stereotype when their 
social category is salient in response to an intergroup context. Thus, low status group 
members should self-stereotype more than high status group members, due to the 
more “chronic” salience of their group membership (Pichevin & Hurtig, 1996). This 
is the hypothesis that guided the present work.  However, from an SIT standpoint, the 
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need for a positive social identity may underlie the effect of status (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986); being high status reinforces the positive social identity, thus leading to higher 
levels of self-stereotyping. These countervailing forces (cognition vs. motivation) 
may contribute to the mixed pattern of results, as it is unclear which factor may “win 
out” in any given situation. Future research is needed to disentangle under what 
conditions salience or motivational factors are more likely to influence the self-
stereotyping effects.  
 Another question to be addressed is whether intergroup processing actually 
predicts self-stereotyping. Based on SCT (Turner et al., 1987), intergroup contexts are 
conducive to self-stereotyping. However, the free response data collected in the 
present research suggests the possibility that although low status group members may 
engage in intergroup processing (e.g. women mentioned “men” more often than men 
mentioned “women”) this does not necessarily mean that they self-stereotype more 
(e.g. women were less likely to spontaneously mention ingroup stereotypes than men). 
Some evidence for the connection between intergroup processing and self-
stereotyping can be drawn from the correlations between intergroup and intragroup 
processing and self-stereotyping in the present studies. Significant correlations 
between mention of the outgroup, and reaction time measures (Studies 3 and 4) with 
perceptions of prototypicality, homogeneity and trait ratings would be suggestive of a 
relationship between processing and self-stereotyping effects.  
Tables 6-13 report these correlations, separately for members of each social 
category (men and women in Studies 1, 3, and 4; straight and gay men in Study 2). 
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The last two rows of Tables 6-9 and the last four rows of tables 10-13 depict the 
processing-self-stereotyping relationships. In this large array of data there was only 
one finding consistent with the intergroup processing – self-stereotyping prediction:  
The more frequently gay men mentioned the outgroup (straight men) in their free 
responses, the more likely they were to mention gay stereotypic traits in these free 
responses as well, r = .59, p < .05 (see Table 9). Although a causal relationship 
cannot be inferred, it appears that when the outgroup category was activated for gay 
men, they tended to self-stereotype more in their descriptions. However, this effect 
was not observed for straight men or for men and women across any of the other 
studies.  
 Overall, mention of the outgroup was not correlated either with other 
measures of intergroup and intragroup processing, nor self-stereotyping measures. In 
Study 4, two other relevant effects emerged. For men, intergroup processing (RT 
measure) was negatively correlated with perceived homogeneity, r = -.26, p < .05: 
Higher levels of intergroup processing were associated with less perceived ingroup 
homogeneity (see Table 12). For women, intragroup processing (RT measure) was 
negatively correlated with self-ratings on feminine traits, r = -.26, p < .05 (Table 13). 
Higher levels of intergroup processing were associated with lower self-ratings of 
ingroup stereotypic traits. In light of the many correlations calculated and the few 
effects, these correlations are likely attributable merely to chance. In short, I have no 
evidence that intergroup processing is conducive to self-stereotyping. Further 
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research is needed to investigate the effects of intergroup processing on various 
operationalizations of self-stereotyping.  
Implications for self-stereotyping research 
 The results of the present studies add to the existing literature on self-
stereotyping in a number of ways. One of the consistent findings was high status 
group members’ spontaneous mention of ingroup stereotypes when describing the 
meaning of their group membership. Self-stereotyping researchers have implemented 
many different operationalizations of self-stereotyping (e.g. perceived prototypicality, 
trait ratings, implicit reaction time measures) but to my knowledge there are no 
studies examining open-ended self-descriptions of the meaning of one’s group 
membership. Qualitative analyses of self-descriptions can further illuminate the self-
stereotyping process. In the present studies, I only coded for whether participants 
mentioned ingroup stereotypes, but future research could examine other features of 
these responses, such as the mention of “we” versus “I” in self-descriptions, with the 
usage of “we” as an indication of the depersonalization process.   
 With regard to the role of comparative context, existing self-stereotyping 
studies that involved priming of intragroup and intergroup contexts (e.g. Haslam et 
al., 1995; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; Onorato & Turner, 2004) typically have not included 
a “default” condition. Guimond et al. (2006) is an exception and the results of that 
research, as discussed previously, map onto the predicted results for this research. 
Therefore, although the findings of Studies 3 and 4 were not particularly illuminating, 
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the present studies make a methodological contribution by further investigating 
“default” processing in self-stereotyping.  
 Although a number of self-stereotyping studies have examined the role of 
group status (e.g. Burkley & Blanton, 2005; Onorato & Turner, 2004; Spears et al., 
1995) only a few have specifically looked at naturally occurring groups, positioned 
differentially in the social hierarchy (e.g. Guimond et al., 2006; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; 
Simon et al., 1991). Previous research has documented differences between naturally 
occurring groups and minimal groups on outgroup and ingroup homogeneity effects 
(Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Mullen & Hu, 1989; Ostrom and Sedikides, 1992), and 
outgroup favoritism (Boldry & Kashy, 1999) to name a few. For example, Mullen and 
Hu’s (1989) meta-analysis on ingroup and outgroup homogeneity effects, found that 
relative heterogeneity was strongest when the ingroup and outgroups consisted of real 
groups (e.g. men and women; sororities), and weakest when the groups were 
artificially created. One explanation for the differential results is that in minimal 
groups the categorization into different groups is the only way for participants to 
make sense of the experimental situation. Therefore, group identification may be the 
only cue that is used to direct one’s perceptions and behaviors toward ingroup and 
outgroup members. In naturally occurring groups, members of these groups do no 
necessarily feel identified with the group, or behave in ways consistent with their 
group membership. Thus, they might not be influenced by the group categorization to 
the same extent as participants in a minimal group (Ellemers et al., 1999).  
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Based on my reasoning, “default” processing is unlikely to differ for high and 
low status artificially created groups because of the nature of the comparative context. 
In minimal group paradigm studies participants are always aware of the existence of 
the other group; it is as salient as the group into which they are sorted, thus rendering 
an intergroup context for all. Although my results are not clearly supportive of the 
differential processing for high and low status group members, future research would 
benefit from further investigating the role of group status in naturally occurring 
groups.  
As noted throughout this paper, a variety of measures have been used in the 
literature attempting to capture the self-stereotyping concept. Simon and Hamilton 
(1994) used three measures of self-stereotyping (self-ratings, perceived similarity 
with ingroup members and ingroup homogeneity) and found that while similarity and 
homogeneity were strongly correlated, neither of them correlated with self-ratings. 
The present studies support Simon and Hamilton’s (1994) findings. As can be seen in 
the upper rows of Tables 6-13, perceived prototypicality and homogeneity were 
highly correlated, ranging from .41 (men, Study 3) to .61 (straight men, Study 2). 
Although overall trait ratings did not correlates with prototypicality and homogeneity, 
there were several exceptions. In Study 3, prototypicality was positively correlated 
with self-ratings on masculine traits for men (r = .26; Table 10) and on feminine traits 
for women (r = .34; Table 11). This finding was partially replicated in Study 4, where 
prototypicality also predicted self-ratings on masculine traits for men (r = .26; Table 
12), but not on feminine traits for women. In Study 3 homogeneity was positively 
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correlated with self-ratings on feminine traits for men (r = .19; Table 10). Mention of 
ingroup stereotypes in free responses was uncorrelated with prototypicality, 
homogeneity, or trait ratings, with the exception of one finding in Study 2, where gay 
men’s mention of ingroup stereotypes was negatively correlated with self-ratings on 
“straight” traits (r = -.75; Table 9).  
 Simon and Hamilton (1994) speculated that self-ratings may reflect “the 
cognitive representation of oneself as an individual (“me” or the individual self),” 
while perceived similarity and homogeneity may reflect “the cognitive representation 
of oneself as a group (“we” or the shared self)” (p. 710).  Similarly, Burkley and 
Blanton (2005) suggest that while prototypicality may be influenced by 
depersonalization (Turner et al., 1987), self-ratings may be influenced by general 
stereotype endorsement (i.e. acceptance of cultural stereotypes).  
 The relative lack of correlation among various self-stereotyping measures and 
some of the speculations in the literature as to why this is the case, lead to important 
questions that should be addressed in future research. Are different processes 
captured depending on how self-stereotyping is operationalized and measured? Does 
prototypicality tap into the perceived interchangeability among group members, and 
self-ratings into comparisons with the ingroup prototype? Is the prototype based on 
the cultural stereotypes, or on the perceiver’s idiosyncratic definition of the social 
category? At minimum, it seems problematic to discuss self-stereotyping as a unitary 
concept when its different operationalizations are largely uncorrelated and produce 
different, sometimes inconsistent, patterns of results. 
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Future research 
Several main questions concerning the impact of group status on intragroup 
and intergroup processing and self-stereotyping remain, providing opportunities for 
future research. First, a more methodologically sound study in which comparative 
context is manipulated should further explore evidence of intergroup versus 
intragroup processing for members of groups positioned differentially in the status 
hierarchy. As suggested earlier, one way in which the comparative context could be 
maintained throughout a study is by manipulating the actual context. Low and high 
status group members could be run in groups consisting of other ingroup participants 
(intragroup) or both ingroup and outgroup members (intergroup), versus an individual 
context. The presence of other people (same status or mixed) will maintain the 
salience of the comparative context throughout the procedure.  
The two implicit measures used in the present studies did not seem to produce 
many meaningful results. The implementation of other, implicit and explicit measures 
may be another way in which the differential processing can be investigated. For 
example, an object decision task (Kroll & Potter, 1984) measuring reaction times to 
male and female associated objects can prove useful in capturing differential 
processing. By using objects versus gender stereotypic traits, it may be less likely to 
activate the outgroup regardless of the comparative context. This paradigm is not 
limited to gender and can be applied to other groups as well.  
A different way to capture intergroup and intragroup processing is to create a 
word-completion task, consisting of word stems that can be completed either with 
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ingroup or outgroup stereotypic traits, or neutral words. Higher numbers of word 
stems completed with ingroup stereotypic traits will be indicative of intragroup 
processing, higher numbers of word stems completed with outgroup traits will be 
indicative of intergroup processing.  
Using other groups positioned differentially in the status hierarchy (besides 
gender and sexual orientation) could also be useful for testing the assessing the 
generalizability of the claim that group status has implication for self-stereotyping 
processes. For example, ethnic minorities including Native Americans, African-
Americans, or Latinos could be compared to Whites in their tendencies to engage in 
differential processing and self-stereotyping.  
Conclusion 
Self-stereotyping is “the perceptual interchangeability or perceptual identity of 
oneself and others in the same group on relevant dimensions” (Turner, 1984).  
Different studies have investigated potential antecedents leading to self-stereotyping 
effects: intergroup context (Turner et al., 1987), group identification (Spears et al., 
1997), threat to group identity (Spears et al., 1997; Verkyuten & Neukee, 2002), and 
relative group size (Simon & Hamilton, 1994) to name a few. The present theoretical 
development and empirical studies suggest that group status (in naturally occurring 
groups positioned differently in the social hierarchy) may have implications for 
“default” processing and in turn self-stereotyping. But the present data are weak and 
inconclusive overall. Additional and more conclusive research is needed to further 
investigate the effect of group status on self-stereotyping.  
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Study 2:  Mean Linguistic Category Model abstraction (SDs) by target (gay/straight) 
and stereotyping index (gay/straight stereotypic behaviors)  
 
 
Index   Gay target  Straight target 
 
 
Gay   2.26 (0.91)  2.23 (0.78) 
 
Straight  1.74 (0.64)  2.45 (0.76) 
 
 
Note: Higher means indicate greater abstraction in characterization of drawings for gay and 








Gender  Masculine traits Feminine traits 
 
 
Men   0.70 (0.16)  0.64 (0.14) 
 





Table 4   
 
Study  4: Classification of RTs that constitute consistent and inconsistent information 
to assess intergroup processing and intragroup processing. 
 
 






Men  masculine “me” /     feminine “me” /  
feminine “not me”    masculine “not me” 
 
Women feminine “me” /    masculine “me” / 





Men  masculine “me” /     feminine “me” / 
masculine “not me”    feminine “not me” 
 
Women feminine “me” /     masculine “me” / 

















Study 4:  Mean identification (SDs) by gender and comparative context 
 
 
Gender  Intergroup  “Default”   Intragroup 
 
 
Men   5.23 (0.83)  4.62 (0.68)   4.94 (0.82)  
 
Women  5.53 (0.86)  5.68 (0.66)  5.42 (0.63) 
 
 




Study 1: Zero-order correlations among intragroup and intergroup processing and 
self-stereotyping measures, male participants 
 
 
Variable   1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
1. Prototypicality  1.0 -- -- -- -- -- 
 
2. Masculine traits  .14 1.0 -- -- -- -- 
 
3. Feminine traits  -.05 .20 1.0 -- -- -- 
 
4. Ingroup stereotypes -.07 .34 -.07 1.0 -- -- 
 
5. Same gender  -.02 -.02 .08 .08 1.0 -- 
 
6. Opposite gender  -.13 -.06 .15 -.33 .46* 1.0 
 
 
Note: Masculine traits is a composite score of the mean trait ratings on stereotypically male 
traits. Feminine traits is a composite score of the mean trait ratings on stereotypically female 
traits. Ingroup stereotypes is the mention of same gender stereotypes in self-descriptions. 
Same and Opposite gender is the mention of the same and opposite gender group on free 
response measure. 




Study 1: Zero-order correlations among intragroup and intergroup processing and 
self-stereotyping measures, female participants 
 
 
Variable   1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
1. Prototypicality  1.0 -- -- -- -- -- 
 
2. Masculine traits  -.21 1.0 -- -- -- -- 
 
3. Feminine traits  .04 .53** 1.0 -- -- -- 
 
4. Ingroup stereotypes -.07 .07 -.38 1.0 -- -- 
 
5. Same gender   .17 -.16 -.09 -.11 1.0 -- 
 
6. Opposite gender  -.15 -.06 -.16 .20 .52** 1.0 
 
 
Note: Masculine traits is a composite score of the mean trait ratings on stereotypically male 
traits. Feminine traits is a composite score of the mean trait ratings on stereotypically female 
traits. Ingroup stereotypes is the mention of same gender stereotypes in self-descriptions. 
Same and Opposite gender is the mention of the same and opposite gender group on free 
response measure. 




Study 2: Zero-order correlations among intragroup and intergroup processing and 




Variable   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
 
1. Prototypicality  1.0 -- -- -- -- -- --  
 
2. Homogeneity  .61** 1.0 -- -- -- -- --  
 
3. Straight traits  .21 .21 1.0 -- -- -- -- 
   
4. Gay traits   -.27 -.10 .12 1.0 -- -- --  
 
5. Ingroup stereotypes .14 -.03 -.002 -.02 1.0 -- --  
 
6. Same orientation  -.12 -.23 -.13 .10 .23 1.0 --  
 




Note: Straight traits is a composite score of the mean trait ratings on stereotypically straight 
men traits. Gay traits is a composite score of the mean trait ratings on stereotypically gay 
traits. Ingroup stereotypes is the mention of same sexual orientation stereotypes in self-
descriptions. Same and Opposite orientation is the mention of the same and opposite sexual 
orientation group on free response measure 






Study 2: Zero-order correlations among intragroup and intergroup processing and 
self-stereotyping measures, gay male participants 
 
 
Variable   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
 
1. Prototypicality  1.0 -- -- -- -- -- --  
 
2. Homogeneity  .53** 1.0 -- -- -- -- --  
 
3. Straight traits  .33 -.07 1.0 -- -- -- -- 
   
4. Gay traits   .19 .05 -.20 1.0 -- -- --  
 
5. Ingroup stereotypes -.29 -.19 -.75** -.03 1.0 -- --  
 
6. Same orientation  -.27 -.59** -.16 .04 .37 1.0 --  
 
7. Opposite orientation -.32 -.25  .42 -.33 .59* .32 1.0  
 
 
Note: Straight traits is a composite score of the mean trait ratings on stereotypically straight 
men traits. Gay traits is a composite score of the mean trait ratings on stereotypically gay 
traits. Ingroup stereotypes is the mention of same sexual orientation stereotypes in self-
descriptions. Same and Opposite orientation is the mention of the same and opposite sexual 
orientation group on free response measure 











































































































































Figure 3. Study 1: Gender X Identification interaction for perceived prototypicality 
































































Figure 4. Study 2: Mention of same- and opposite-sexual orientation in free responses 
































Figure 5. Study 2: Sexual orientation X Identification interaction for perceived 
prototypicality (low ID is one SD below the mean for identification and High ID is 






















Figure 6. Study 3: Reaction times (sec) on LDT category activation task, by 




















Figure 7a. Study 3: Reaction times (sec) on LDT category activation task, by 



















Figure 7b. Study 3: Reaction times (sec) on LDT category activation task, by 
























































































































masculine "me"/ feminine "not me" feminine "me"/ masculine "not me"








































masculine "me"/ masculine "not me" feminine "me"/ feminine "not me"





















































Figure 12. Study 4: Mean trait ratings on warmth and competitiveness by gender 
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Appendix A: Materials Study 1 
 
 











1. _____ I feel a bond with women /men. 
2. _____ I feel solidarity with women /men. 
3. _____ I feel committed to women / men. 
4. _____ I am glad to be a woman / man 
5. _____ I think that women/men have a lot to be proud of. 
6. _____ It is pleasant to be a woman/ man. 
7. _____ Being a woman/man gives me a good feeling. 
8. _____ I often think about the fact that I am a woman/man. 
9. _____ The fact that I am a woman/man is an important part of my identity 
10. ____ Being a woman /man is an important part of how I see myself. 
11. ____ I have a lot in common with the average woman /man. 
12. ____ I am similar to the average woman/man. 
13. ____ Women/men have a lot in common with each other. 








Rate yourself on each of the following items, using this scale: 
 













_____ 1. calm      ______ 11. weak 
 
_____ 2. athletic     ______ 12. insensitive 
 
_____ 3. caring     ______ 13. competitive 
 
_____ 4. shy      ______ 14. compassionate 
 
_____ 5. confident     ______ 15. arrogant 
 
_____ 6. aggressive     ______ 16. faithful 
 
_____ 7. sad      ______ 17. sweet 
 
_____ 8. outspoken     ______ 18. intelligent 
 
_____ 9. attractive     ______ 19. sensitive 
 
_____ 10. strong 
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1. ______ I am different from the average woman / man. 
2. ______ I am similar to the average woman / man.  
 
3. How old are you? ________ 
 
4. What is your ethnicity? _____________ 
 
5. Are you a native English speaker? YES/NO 
 
6. Were you born in the U.S.? YES/NO 
 147 
 
Appendix B: Materials Study 2  
 
Rate YOURSELF (GAY MEN / STRAIGHT MEN) on each of the following 
items, using this scale: 
 













_____ 1. artistic     ______ 12. hypersensitive 
 
_____ 2. physically tough    ______ 13. impatient 
 
_____ 3. dominating     ______ 14. expressive 
 
_____ 4. timid      ______ 15. masculine 
 
_____ 5. strong     ______ 16. inattentive 
 
_____ 6. compassionate    ______ 17. whinny 
 
_____ 7. catty      ______ 18. competent 
 
_____ 8. sensitive     ______ 19. independent 
 
_____ 9. emotional     ______ 20. aggressive 
 
_____ 10. assertive     ______ 21. promiscuous 
 




























Please, by using the following scale (1 not at all to 7 definitely at all) indicate the 
extent to which women/men are efficient, outgoing, studious, and sociable. (control 
condition) 
 
Please, by using the following scale (1 not at all to 7 definitely at all) indicate the 
extent to which women/men are efficient, outgoing, studious, and sociable. As you do 
this rating keep in mind the variability between men and women. Thus focus on the 
differences between men and women (between groups condition) 
 
Please, by using the following scale (1 not at all to 7 definitely at all) indicate the 
extent to which women/men are efficient, outgoing, studious, and sociable. As you do 
this rating keep in mind the variability between women/men. Thus focus on the 





 Words and Non-Words for lexical decision task: 
 
 













































What is your gender? ____________ 
How old are you? ________ 
 
What is your ethnicity? _____________ 
 
Are you a native English speaker? YES/NO 
 
Were you born in the U.S.? YES/NO 
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Appendix D: Materials Study 4 
Manipulation 
You will see a mask XXXXX followed by an attribute word. Your task is to press “i” 
if the attribute word applies to you (it is self-descriptive of yourself) and to press “e” 
if the attribute word does not apply to you (it is not self-descriptive of yourself). 
Please, respond as quickly as possible. (control condition) 
 
You will see a mask XXXXX followed by an attribute word. Your task is to press “i” 
if the attribute word applies to you (it is self-descriptive of yourself) and to press “e” 
if the attribute word does not apply to you (it is not self-descriptive of yourself). As 
you do this evaluation of the self, keep in mind the differences between men and 
women. Thus focus on the application of the attribute to you in comparison with 
women/men. Please, respond as quickly as possible. (between condition) 
 
You will see a mask XXXXX followed by an attribute word. Your task is to press “i” 
if the attribute word applies to you (it is self-descriptive of yourself) and to press “e” 
if the attribute word does not apply to you (it is not self-descriptive of yourself). As 
you do this evaluation of the self, keep in mind the differences between women/men. 
Thus focus on the application of the attribute to you in comparison with other 
women/men. Please, respond as quickly as possible. (within condition) 
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1 An implicit trait-based measure of self-stereotyping (e.g. reaction times to endorse 
traits) is different from the process of implicit self-stereotyping—activation of 
self-relevant stereotypes outside of one’s conscious awareness (Levy, 1996).  
 
2 The self-ratings in the control conditions were significantly different from each 
other as well, mimicking the pattern in the intergroup comparison condition but 
less powerfully. Implications of these findings will be discussed later in the paper. 
 
3 Interestingly, the difference was more pronounced for countries that were 
unfavorably evaluated.                 
 
4 The group-level self-investment subscale is further divided into three subscales: 
solidarity, centrality and satisfaction. Since there are no specific predictions for 
each subscale in the current studies, I am treating the group-level self-investment 
subscale as a measure of identification.   
 
5 Since the nature of the coding (presence and absence of particular information) 
produces categorical data, chi-square analyses were run for the same data as well, 
producing identical results. For mention of same gender, χ2 (1, N = 57) = 4.88, p = 
.03 and mention of opposite gender, χ2(1, N = 57) = 3.97, p = .05, with the 
proportion of women mentioning both same and opposite gender higher than the 
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proportion of men. Similarly, chi-square analysis for mentioning same-gender 
stereotypes produced identical results, χ2(1, N = 57) = 8.44, p = .01, with the 
proportion of men mentioning same-gender stereotypes higher than the proportion 
of women.  
 
6 Since the main premise of the dissertation is that group status will have implications 
for intergroup and intergroup processing, I asked this question to examine whether 
perceptions of lower or not lower status would have differential effects on self-
stereotyping effects. Straight and gay men did not differentially perceive gay men 
to have lower status in society (72% of straight men and 87% of gay men viewed 
gay men as having lower status). Separate 2 (sexual orientation) X 2 (perceived 
status of gays: Not lower than straights/lower) ANOVAs on all dependent 
variables did not reveal any statistically significant differences.  
 
7 Gay men rated themselves to be more liberal than straight men.  Separate multiple 
regressions for all dependent variables, with sexual orientation, political 
orientation and their interaction as predictors, were run. Political orientation 
interacted with sexual orientation in judgments of prototypicality and 
homogeneity, with liberal gay men seeing themselves as less prototypical and gays 
as less homogeneous. This effect was largely driven by identification, as liberalism 
was correlated with low identification among gay men (r = -.47). The politics 
variable will not be discussed further.  
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8 As in Study 1, mention of same- and opposite sexual orientation were analyzed 
using chi-square analyses. For mention of same sexual orientation, χ2(1, N = 56) = 
4.55, p = .03, and mention of opposite sexual orientation, χ2(1, N = 56) = 4.49, p = 
.03, with straight men mentioning same and opposite sexual orientation more often 
than gay men. For mention of same-sexual orientation stereotypes chi-square 
analysis produces similar results, χ2 (1, N = 56) = 4.25, p = .04, with straight men 
mentioning same-sexual orientation stereotypes more often than gay men.  
 
9 Although the analyses were run with the log-transformed variables, all reported 
results are in untransformed seconds.  
 
10 As in Studies 1 and 2, mention of same- and opposite- gender, and same-gender 
stereotypes were analyzed using chi-square analyses. For mention of same gender, 
χ2 (1, N = 228) = 3.19, p = .08, and mention of opposite gender, χ2 (1, N = 228) = 
6.96, p = .008, with women mentioning their own and the opposite gender more 
often than men. For same-gender stereotypes, χ2 (1, N = 228) = 11.28, p = .001, 
with men mentioning same-gender stereotypes more often than women. The 
differences across comparative contexts were not significant, χ2 < 3.15, p > .21.  
 
11 Similarly to Study 2, I included a perceptions of women’s’ status question. Women 
more than men viewed women as having lower status: 41% of men and 60% of 
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women viewed women as having lower status. Separate 2 (gender) X 2 (perceived 
status of women: Not lower than men/lower) ANOVAs on all dependent variables 
reveal some difference on prototypicality and homogeneity but they were not 
theoretically driven and did not contribute to clarification of the current findings.  
 
12 Similar to Study 3, although the analyses were run with the log-transformed 
variables, all reported results are in seconds.  
 
13 These me/not me data were also analyzed using a mixed-design ANOVA with trait 
type (masculine vs. feminine) and trait application to the self (“me” vs. “not me”) 
as the within-subject variables and participant gender and comparative context as 
the between-subjects variables. A significant Trait Type X Gender interaction, F(1, 
152) = 7.34, p < .01 and a main effect of trait application to the self, F(1, 152) = 
95.45, p < .001, were revealed. These effects were qualified by a Trait Type X 
Gender X Application to self interaction, F(1, 152) = 9.43, p < .01. T-tests 
indicated that women tended to respond faster to masculine “me” and to feminine 
“me” traits than men did. There were no comparative condition effects, Fs < 1.25, 
ps> .29.  
 
14 Chi-square analyses revealed similar results. The proportion of women versus men 
was higher for mentions of own gender (.83 versus .63) and the opposite gender 
(.30 versus .17), but these difference were not significant; same gender, χ2 (1, N = 
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159) = 1.63, p = .20; opposite gender, χ2 (1, N = 159) = 1.94, p = .16. Similarly, 
the difference between the proportion of men and women mentioning same-gender 
stereotypes was not significant, χ2 (1, N = 159) = .79, p = .37. The differences 
across comparative contexts were not significant, χ2 < 2.96, ps > .23.  
  
